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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine this scenario: A woman seeking a retail job is informed
that the job can only be applied for online. The position is a salesclerk
for a retail company with store hours from 9:00 AM to 9:00 PM. She is
interested in the morning and afternoon hours, as she has children who
are in school until 3:00 PM. When completing the application, she
reaches a screen where she is prompted to register her hours of
availability. She enters 9:00 AM to 3:00 PM, Monday through Friday.
However, when she hits the button to advance to the next screen, she
receives an error message indicating that she has not completed the
current section. She refreshes her screen, she restarts her computer, and
still the same error message remains. Finally, in frustration, she
abandons the application. Compare the above to this second scenario:
A fifty-three-year-old man is applying for a job that requires a college
degree. But when he attempts to complete the application online, he
finds that the drop-down menu offers only college graduation dates that
go back to the year 2000. The automated hiring platform will, in effect,
exclude many applicants who are older than forty years old. If the man
also chooses to forgo the application like the woman in the previous
scenario, the automated hiring system may not retain any record of the
two failed attempts to complete the job application. 1
The vignettes above reflect the real-life experiences of job
applicants who must now contend with automated hiring systems in
their bid for employment. 2 These stories illustrate the potential for
1. See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016).
2. Patricia G. Barnes, Behind the Scenes, Discrimination by Job Search Engines, AGE
DISCRIMINATION EMP. (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.agediscriminationinemployment.com/
behind-the-scenes-discrimination-by-job-search-engines/ [https://perma.cc/YRY3-JZSV];
Ifeoma Ajunwa & Daniel Greene, Platforms at Work: Data Intermediaries in the
Organization of the Workplace, in WORK AND LABOR IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2019) (discussing

No. 2]

Auditing Imperative

623

automated hiring systems to discreetly and disproportionately cull the
applications of job seekers who are from legally protected classes. 3
Given that legal scholars have identified a “bias in, bias out” problem
for automated decision-making. 4 Automated hiring as a socio-technical
trend challenges the American bedrock ideal of equal opportunity in
employment, 5 as such automated practices may not only be deployed
to exclude certain categories of workers but may also be used to justify
the inclusion of other classes as more “fit” for the job. 6 This is a cause
for the legal concern that algorithms may be used to manipulate the
labor market in ways that negate equal employment opportunity. 7 This
concern is further exacerbated given that nearly all Fortune 500
companies now use algorithmic recruitment and hiring tools. 8
Algorithmic hiring has also saturated the low-wage retail market, with
the top twenty Fortune 500 companies, which are mostly retail and
commerce companies that boast large numbers of employees, almost
exclusively hiring through online platforms. 9
Although it is undeniable that there could be tangible economic
benefits of adopting automated decision-making, 10 the received
wisdom of the objectivity of automated decision-making, coupled with
an unquestioning acceptance of the results of algorithmic decisionmaking, 11 have allowed hiring systems to proliferate without adequate
legal oversight. As Professor Margot Kaminski notes, addressing
algorithmic decision-making concerns requires both individual and
the encountered difficulty of completing an online application when applying with
constrained hours of availability).
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 guarantees equal opportunity in employment
irrespective of race, gender, and other protected characteristics. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e17.
4. See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2224 (2019) (arguing
that the problem of disparate impact in predictive risk algorithms lies not in the algorithmic
system but in the nature of prediction itself); Sonia Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age
of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 58 (2019) (noting the bias that exists within
artificial intelligence (“AI”) systems and arguing for private mechanisms to govern AI
systems); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 87 (2017) (“This new
family of algorithms hold enormous promise, but also poses new and unusual dangers.”).
5. Ajunwa & Greene, supra note 2; see also Pauline Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at
Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 860 (2017) [hereinafter Data-Driven Discrimination at
Work].
6. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1671, 1671 (2020).
7. See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 996, 999
(2014); Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 165
(2017); Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 157, 158, 160–61 (2019); Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum,
Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 2, 10
(2019); Pauline Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, 106 VA. L. REV. 867, 869 (2020).
8. LINDA BARBER, INST. FOR EMP. STUD., E-RECRUITMENT DEVELOPMENTS 3 (2006).
9. Ajunwa & Greene, supra note 2, at 71–72.
10. See infra Section II.A.
11. See Ajunwa, supra note 6, at 1684–85.
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systemic approaches. 12 Currently, the algorithmic decisions made in
the private sector are largely unregulated, and Kaminski argues for a
collaborative approach to governance that could satisfy both individual
and collective concerns:
Collaborative governance is a middle ground, a third
way, that aims to harness the benefits of selfregulation without its pitfalls. The government stays
significantly involved as a backdrop threat to nudge
private sector involvement, as a forum for convening
and empowering conflicting voices, as an arbiter or
certifier in the name of the public interest, and as a
hammer that can come down to enforce compliance. 13
Thus, the goal of this Article is neither to argue against or for the
use of automated decision-making in employment, nor is it to examine
whether automated hiring systems are better than humans at making
hiring decisions. For antidiscrimination law, the efficacy of any
particular hiring system is a secondary concern to ensuring that any
such system does not unlawfully discriminate against protected
categories. 14 Therefore, my aim is to suggest collaborative regulatory
regimes for automated hiring systems that will ensure that any benefits
of automated hiring are not negated by (un)intended outcomes, such as
unlawful discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics.
Furthermore, this Article owes a debt to Professor Katherine
Strandburg, who notes that explainability has important normative and
practical implications for system design. 15 Specifically, Strandburg
notes that inscrutable decision tools disrupt the explanatory flows
among the multiple actors responsible for determining goals, selecting
decision criteria, and applying those criteria. 16 Thus, seeking the
explainability of automated decisions is not just for the benefit of the
decision subjects, but really for the benefit of all interested in the
outcomes. 17

12. See Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to
Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1529, 1533 (2019).
13. Id. at 1561.
14. As Professor Charles Sullivan notes: “[T]he antidiscrimination statutes don’t really
care whether any particular selection device actually improves productivity so long as it does
not discriminate.” Charles Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 398 (2018).
15. Katherine Strandburg, Rulemaking and Inscrutable Automated Decision Tools, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1851, 1867–72 (2019).
16. See id. at 1851.
17. See id. at 1857–58; see also Deirdre K. Mulligan, Daniel N. Kluttz & Nitin Kohli,
Shaping Our Tools: Contestability as a Means to Promote Responsible Algorithmic Decision
Making in the Professions, in AFTER THE DIGITAL TORNADO (Kevin Werbach ed., 2020).
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In a similar vein, Talia Gillis and Josh Simons have argued against
focusing on accountability of individual actors. 18 Rather, they note that
“[t]he focus on individual, technical explanations . . . [is] driven by an
uncritical bent towards transparency.” 19 Instead, they advocate that
“[i]nstitutions should justify their choices about the design and
integration of machine learning models not to individuals, but to
empowered regulators or other forms of public oversight bodies.” 20
Furthermore, Professor Pauline Kim makes the case that the law
does allow for the revision of algorithmic systems to address bias. 21
Thus, she argues that the law permits using auditing to detect and
correct for discriminatory bias. 22 Kim argues that auditing should be an
important strategy for examining whether the outcomes of automated
hiring systems comport with equal opportunity in employment
guidelines. 23
The insights of these legal scholars and others 24 form the
foundation for my contribution in this Article, in which I posit an
auditing imperative for automated hiring systems. Building on
Professor Kim’s essay, I argue not just that the law allows for the audits,
but that the spirit of antidiscrimination law requires it. That is, I follow
the footsteps of legal scholars like Professors Richard Thompson
Ford, 25 James Grimmelmann, 26 Robert Post, 27 David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, 28 and Noah Zatz, 29 to argue that employment
18. See Talia Gillis & Josh Simons, Explanation < Justification: GDPR and the Perils of
Privacy, 2 J.L. & INNOVATION 71 (2019).
19. Id. at 76.
20. Id. at 81.
21. Pauline Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189,
191 (2017) [hereinafter Auditing Algorithms] (responding to Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey,
Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu,
Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 636 (2017)).
22. See id. at 197–99.
23. See id. at 202.
24. See Bryan Casey, Ashkon Farhangi & Roland Vogl, Rethinking Explainable Machines:
The GDPR’s “Right to Explanation” Debate and the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in Enterprise,
34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 143, 153–68 (2019). Other scholars have thought about audits in the
GDPR context, but I bring the idea of audits to the American employment and labor law
context.
25. See Richard Thompson Ford, Rethinking Rights after the Second Reconstruction, 132
YALE L.J. 2942 (2014) [hereinafter Rethinking Rights]; see also Richard Thompson Ford,
Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1381 (2014)
[hereinafter Bias in the Air].
26. See James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7
CALIF. L. REV. 164, 171–74 (2017).
27. See Robert Post, 1998–99 Brennan Center Symposium Lecture: Prejudicial
Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 36
(2000).
28. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899
(1993) [hereinafter Negligent Discrimination].
29. See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and
the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2009)
[hereinafter Managing the Macaw].
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antidiscrimination law imposes an affirmative duty of care on
employers to ensure that they are avoiding practices that would
constrain equal opportunity in employment. Thus, I argue, that when
employers choose to use algorithmic systems, fulfilling their duty of
care entails regular audits of those systems. In turn, audits necessitate
the record-keeping and data retention mandates that I also propose in
this Article.
I note here that automated hiring systems exist in a plethora of
forms, with each iteration presenting distinct legal issues. This is
because each form of automated hiring does not offer the same level of
automation. Ranging from the least automated (which allows for the
most human intervention) to the most automated (which allows for the
least human intervention), there are: applicant tracking systems
(“ATS”), which employ algorithms that parse resumes for keywords; 30
machine learning algorithms that could be trained on selecting resumes
and deployed to rank them in hundreds or thousands; 31 and video
screening systems, such as HireVue, which provide automated
assessments based on facial analysis and vocal indications. 32 To offer
a full portrait of the proliferation of automated hiring platforms and
associated legal issues, the Appendix offers a survey of extant
automated hiring systems in which I detail a sampling of the companies
currently using those systems, as well as their potentially problematic
features. This Article does not delve into the specific legal issues
associated with each iteration of automated hiring system; rather, it
recognizes that all job applications share several common legal
problems regardless of which iteration of automated hiring system
applies, and that the greatest obstacle is meeting the standard of proof
for employment discrimination.
But first, consider the growing trend towards automated video
interview assessment as perhaps the most extreme of automated hiring
systems. According to one article, one of the leaders in the automated
video interview market, HireVue, “uses AI to analyze word choice,
tone, and facial movement of job applicants who do video
interviews.” 33 For some candidates, such video assessments recall an
30. See, e.g., CLEVERSTAFF, https://cleverstaff.net [https://perma.cc/2KBM-5VQH].
31. Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against
Women, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2018, 10:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-thatshowed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G
[https://perma.cc/6SA7-R35L]
(“[A]mazon’s computer models were trained to vet applicants by observing patterns in
resumes submitted to the company over a 10-year period. Most came from men, a reflection
of male dominance across the tech industry.”).
32. See HIREVUE, http://hirevue.com [https://perma.cc/QLH3-QXQM].
33. Richard Feloni, I Tried the Software That Uses AI to Scan Job Applicants for
Companies Like Goldman Sachs and Unilever Before Meeting Them — and It’s Not as Creepy
as
It
Sounds,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Aug.
23,
2017,
11:00
AM),
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approach 34 to hiring that is reminiscent of Frederik Winslow Taylor’s
time series experiments on factory workers. 35 Relating his experience
with HireVue, one candidate whose answers were interrupted by a
timer noted: “You just see yourself and a stopwatch ticking down.” 36
But the destabilizing effect of timed responses is not the greatest
problem associated with automated video interviewing. As researchers
have noted, many of these systems are trained on white male faces and
voices, which poses a problem for any applicants who diverge from that
norm. 37 Thus, applicants who are white women, non-binary persons, or
racial minorities may have their facial expressions or tone of voice
mischaracterized by automated video interviewing platforms. 38
Other important concerns raised by critics of automated video
interviewing systems are: the collection of the applicant’s personal
data, the “black box” nature of how such information is used, 39 and a
lack of worker’s agency and control over the portability of the data. As
Dan Lyons notes in his book, Lab Rats:
HireVue’s robot recruiting system is building a
database of deep, rich psychographic information on
millions of people. Moreover, the data is not
anonymous. Your psychographic blueprint is
connected to all of your personal information —
name, address, email, phone number, work history,
education. And they have you on video. Everything

https://www.businessinsider.com/hirevue-ai-powered-job-interview-platform-2017-8
[https://perma.cc/3R8D-Y6QN].
34. See generally FREDERIK WINSLOW TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT (1911); cf. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Joel Ford, Health and Big Data:
An Ethical Framework for Health Information Collection by Corporate Wellness Programs,
44 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 474 (2016) (positing that workforce science, as an iteration of
Taylorism, now focuses on the worker’s body rather than the job task).
35. See, e.g., Rebecca Greenfield, The Rise of the (Truly Awful) Webcam Job Interview,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-1012/the-rise-of-the-truly-awful-webcam-job-interview [https://perma.cc/M93J-QTY8].
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Tess Townsend, Most Engineers Are White — and So Are the Faces That
They Use to Train Software, VOX: RECODE (Jan. 18, 2017, 11:45 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2017/1/18/14304964/data-facial-recognition-trouble-recognizingblack-white-faces-diversity [https://perma.cc/HG4C-SEP6] (“A lack of diversity in the
training set leads to an inability to easily characterize faces that do not fit the normal face
derived from the training set.” (emphasis omitted)).
38. See Thor Benson, Your Next Job Interview Could Be with a Racist Bot, DAILY BEAST
(Apr. 20, 2018, 11:01 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/your-next-job-interview-couldbe-with-a-racist-bot [https://perma.cc/QRG3-D3WU].
39. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 16 (2015) (arguing that unregulated and opaque data
collection is contributing to social inequality).
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you say in an interview can follow you around for the
rest of your life. 40
Yet, there are no federal regulations as to the collection, storage, or use
of data from automated hiring platforms, and in effect, employers have
carte blanche to adopt self-serving practices. 41
In their seminal essay on privacy law, Samuel D. Warren and Louis
L. Brandeis argue that Americans should have the “right to be let
alone.” 42 The scholars start by writing “[t]hat the individual shall have
full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the
common law; but it has been found necessary from time to time to
define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection.” 43 Thus,
they suggest molding common law to fit the times — including the
political, social, and economic changes that regularly occur. 44 I note
here the growing tendency to deny this “right to be let alone” to
workers. Increasingly, workers are being called upon to exchange their
privacy for the mere opportunity to be considered for employment. 45
With recent technological advances in automated hiring, and especially
given the current trend towards automated video interviewing which
accumulates even more data about the candidate’s person than could
have previously been imagined, employment antidiscrimination law is
in dire need of updates. In this Article, I argue that such updates to the
law should not just acknowledge the auditing imperative, but also
recognize worker’s agency to control the end uses and portability of
data (much of it now biometric) subsumed by the algorithmic hiring
apparatus. 46
In this context, it is alarming that a recent study by the Pew
Research Center found that most Americans underestimate the
prevalence of these automated hiring platforms in the workplace. 47 The
study revealed that “fewer than half of Americans are familiar with the
concept of computer programs that can review job applications without
40. DAN LYONS, LAB RATS: HOW SILICON VALLEY MADE WORK MISERABLE FOR THE
REST OF US 159 (2019).
41. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative
Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1160 (2017) (“Despite
this interpretive limitation, machine-learning algorithms have been implemented widely in
private-sector settings. Companies desire the savings in costs and efficiency gleaned from
these techniques.”).
42. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 6 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105
CAL. L. REV. 735, 736 (2017).
46. See infra Parts IV, V.
47. AARON SMITH & MONICA ANDERSON, PEW RSCH. CTR., AUTOMATION IN EVERYDAY
LIFE
50
(2017),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/
10/03151500/PI_2017.10.04_Automation_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4E4-B47W].
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any human involvement.” 48 In fact, 57% of Americans say that they
have heard nothing at all about automated hiring platforms in the past. 49
Of the respondents who were aware of automated hiring systems, 76%
stated that they would not want to apply for jobs through such a
system. 50 The given reasons for that response varied, but most
commonly, the individuals expressed the belief that computer systems
could not capture everything about an applicant. 51 One woman wrote,
“[a] computer cannot measure the emotional intelligence or intangible
assets that many humans have.” 52 Another stated, “I do believe that
hiring people requires a fair amount of judgment and intuition that is
not well automated.” 53 On the other side of this spectrum, however,
22% of the individuals surveyed reported that they would want to apply
for jobs that use a computer program to make hiring decisions. 54 The
most common rationale for this response was the belief that software
would be less biased than human reviewers. 55
I have previously argued that a misguided belief in the objectivity
of automated decision-making has ushered in automated hiring as an
anti-bias intervention. 56 I have further argued that the framing of
discovered bias in automated decision-making systems as a technical
problem, rather than a legal problem, has stymied attempts at solving
the problem. 57 Professor Sandra Mayson has also argued that “the
source of racial inequality in risk assessment [which is a type of
automated decision-making] lies neither in the input data, nor in a
particular algorithm, nor in algorithmic methodology per se.” 58 Rather,
“the deep problem is the nature of prediction itself. All prediction looks
to the past to make guesses about future events. In a racially stratified
world, any method of prediction will project the inequalities of the past
into the future.” 59 For automated decision-making in employment, I
argue that not only is the nature of prediction problematic (particularly
given historical employment discrimination), but also, the manner in
which such prediction is accomplished further creates opportunities for
unlawful discrimination and exclusion.
I identify four major problems with automated hiring: (1) the
design features of automated hiring platforms may enable them to serve
as culling systems that discreetly eliminate applicants from protected
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 52.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Ajunwa, supra note 6, at 1671.
57. Id.
58. See Mayson, supra note 4, at 2218.
59. Id.
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categories without retaining a record; (2) automated hiring systems that
allow for the deployment of proxies for protected categories, like
gender or race, can be used to present discriminatory employment
results as fair; (3) intellectual property law, specifically trade secret,
protects automated hiring systems from outside scrutiny and allows
discrimination to go undetected; and (4) a worker’s lack of control over
the portability of applicant data captured by automated hiring systems
increases the chance of repeated employment discrimination, thus
raising the specter of an algorithmically permanently excluded class 60
of job applicants, meaning that certain applicants might find themselves
“algorithmically blackballed.” 61
When it comes to using litigation to redress employment
discrimination, these problematic features of automated hiring present
obstacles to workers: (1) at higher levels of automation, it becomes
difficult to determine intent to discriminate, which is required for
finding liability under the disparate treatment cause of action under
Title VII; 62 (2) when bringing suit under the disparate impact cause of
action, the design features of automated hiring systems, as well as trade
secret claims that may arise, impede the plaintiff’s ability to provide the
statistical proof required to establish a prima facie case; and
(3) litigation remedies in employment antidiscrimination law do not
address privacy and discrimination issues associated with the collection
of personal and biometric data from job candidates, as enabled by
automated video interviewing. I argue then that employment law, with
its emphasis on litigation as redress for employment discrimination, is
limited in its capacity to address the full spectrum of identified
problems with automated hiring.
This Article pushes the boundaries of existing employment law
scholarship by proposing alternative approaches to solving the issue of
bias in automated employment decision-making, in addition to offering
methods for strengthening existing litigation redress mechanisms.
Alternative approaches to litigation represent an important contribution
given that employment discrimination plaintiffs generally do not fare
well in court. 63 Thus, I argue that administrative measures, such as
60. Richard A. Bales & Katherine V.W. Stone, The Invisible Web at Work: Artificial
Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance in the Workplace, 41 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMP. L.
1, 1 (2020) (“The data collected is transformed by means of artificial intelligence (AI)
algorithms into a permanent electronic resume that can identify and predict an individual’s
performance as well as their work ethic, personality, union proclivity, employer loyalty, and
future health care costs.”).
61. See infra Section V.C.4.
62. Sullivan, supra note 14, at 397 (exploring the legal difficulties of assigning intent to a
machine learning automated hiring system, when the machine can learn from previous
decisions and write its own follow-on models).
63. See Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead,
Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1944 (2004) (“The 5.8% reversal rate of
defendant trial victories is smaller in employment discrimination cases than any other
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mandated audits, are necessary and currently under-utilized means for
achieving the bedrock legal principle of equal opportunity in
employment. In addition, I propose labor law processes, such as
collective bargaining, which have also been found to influence business
practices for the better 64 and could be instrumental in both clarifying
workers’ rights and delineating employers’ responsibilities under an
automated hiring regime.
The Article is then organized as follows. Part II reviews the
business case for automated hiring as well as the potential for misuse
of automated hiring systems. Part III parses some solutions that focus
on some of the technological shortcomings of automated hiring systems
and notes the limitations of such techno-solutionist approaches. Part IV
discusses the gaps in current employment law framework for
addressing bias in automated hiring — notably, disparate impact claims
present a high hurdle for plaintiffs, especially in the case of automated
hiring systems when the means of proof is solely under the control of
the employer. Part V examines the potential for a hybrid approach to
tackling bias in employment discrimination that combines ex post
approaches (in particular internal and external auditing mandates) with
ex ante approaches, such as (1) contractual protections for employers
who rely on vendor representations of bias reduction, (2) fairness-bydesign principles that could be implemented as part of Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) guidelines to prevent
discrimination in automated hiring, and (3) collective bargaining that
would address both data input into automated hiring systems and
worker control over the afterlife of the data created by these systems.

II. AUTOMATED HIRING AS BUSINESS PRACTICE
In this Part, I discuss the business case for the trend towards
automated hiring. I also note the potential for automated hiring systems
category of cases except prisoner habeas corpus trials.”); see also Ruth Colker, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 n.9
(1999) (finding that between 1992 and 1998, defendants prevailed in more than 92% of cases
decided at the trial court level and were more likely to be affirmed on appeal); Theodore
Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO.
L.J. 1567, 1578 (1989) (noting that only claims filed by prisoners have a lower success rate
than that of employment discrimination plaintiffs); cf. Michael Selmi, The Evolution of
Employment Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014
WIS. L. REV. 937, 938 (2014) (“Employment discrimination law has long been ripe for
updating. Many of the core cases regarding how discrimination is defined and proved arose
in the 1970s in a very different era and were designed to address very different kinds of
discrimination.”).
64. See Alison D. Morantz, What Unions Do for Regulation, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
515, 527–28 (2017) (surveying literature from an array of regulatory domains —
antidiscrimination, environmental protection, product quality, corporate governance, law
enforcement, tax compliance, minimum wage and overtime protection, and occupational
safety and health — to show that unions tend to increase the level of regulatory compliance).
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to be misused to produce unlawful employment discrimination.
Furthermore, I describe how such systems may serve to mask
employment discrimination or impede its detection.
A. The Business Case
Automated hiring systems have proliferated because they are
perceived as both cost-effective and efficient. A Forbes article notes
that artificial intelligence (“AI”) will quickly emerge as a key tool for
human resources (“HR”) because of the current talent scarcity and low
unemployment. 65 Companies on average spend approximately four
thousand dollars per candidate on the hiring process, including
interviewing, scheduling, and conducting assessments. 66 However, the
adoption of automated hiring makes the hiring process much less
costly. This might be why, according to a Deloitte Bersin report,
companies that use technologies, such as AI and predictive data
analytics, are more successful than those who do not. 67 For instance,
one report indicates that the companies using AI technology show 18%
higher revenue and 30% greater profitability compared to those without
the tools. 68
A report by Ideal demonstrates how automated hiring allows
companies to be efficient in hiring by detailing the time commitment
required for traditional hiring. 69 On average, companies spend fourteen
hours per week manually completing tasks that could be automated. 70
Twenty-eight percent indicate that they spend twenty hours or more,
and 11% spend thirty hours or more on such tasks. 71 Also, 41% of HR
managers say not fully automating their manual hiring processes has
led to lower productivity, and 35% have experienced higher costs for
the same reason. 72 In addition to lower efficiency and productivity, not
fully automating manual processes in HR seems to have affected hiring
65. Gal Almog, Recruiting Isn’t Enough: How AI Is Changing the Rules in the Human
Capital Market, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2018, 8:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/groupthink/2018/02/09/traditional-recruiting-isnt-enough-how-ai-is-changing-therules-in-the-human-capital-market/#729e2624274a [https://perma.cc/EXB3-XLH7].
66. See id. (citing DELOITTE DEV. LLC, THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: 2018
DELOITTE GLOBAL HUMAN CAPITAL TRENDS (2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/HumanCapital/gx-hc-trends-rise-socialenterprise.pdf [https://perma.cc/XU3N-2QXR]).
67. See Almog, supra note 65 (citing DELOITTE DEV. LLC, supra note 66).
68. See DENISE MOULTON & ROBIN ERICKSON, USING TALENT ACQUISITION TO DRIVE
CRITICAL TALENT RESULT 2–3 (2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/
Documents/human-capital/us-hc-using-talent-acquisition-to-drive-critical-talent-results.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8APZ-ZGJC]; see also Almog, supra note 65.
69. Ji-A Min, 12 Revealing Stats on How Recruiters Feel About AI, IDEAL (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://ideal.com/how-recruiters-feel-about-ai/ [https://perma.cc/RLZ8-DT6L].
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
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decisions regarding the best talent, as 17% of HR managers state that it
has led to a poor candidate experience. 73
Other articles also tout the benefits of adopting automated hiring
processes. For instance, a LinkedIn Talent Blog post claims that a
recruiting algorithm increases the accuracy of selecting productive
employees by more than 50%. 74 An article by Monster.com, a global
employment website, boasts that using big data to evaluate candidates
has lowered turnover for companies, with a median reduction of 38%.75
Furthermore, in the article In Hiring, Algorithms Beat Instinct, the
authors argue that hiring algorithms produce more objective outcomes
than do human decision makers. 76 The authors note that although
humans are adept at specifying qualifications for a job and drawing out
information from candidates, HR managers find it difficult to weigh the
results; 77 according to one analysis, a simple equation performed better
than human decisions, regardless of the number of candidates and types
of jobs. 78 Another study found that although hiring managers can be
greatly familiar with their organizations and have more insight beyond
a two-dimensional job description, they are also easily distracted by
marginal things, such as applicants’ compliments, and “use information
inconsistently.” 79 Yet another study found that a job-screening
algorithm “favored ‘nontraditional’ candidates” much more than
human screeners did, “exhibit[ing] significantly less bias against
candidates that were underrepresented at the firm.” 80 Some other
algorithmic studies related to credit applications, criminal justice,
public resource allocations, and corporate governance all concluded

73. See id.
74. Maren Hogan, 8 Hiring Stats That Will Change the Way You Recruit, LINKEDIN:
TALENT BLOG (Sept. 8, 2016), https://business.linkedin.com/talent-solutions/blog/trendsand-research/2016/8-hiring-stats-that-will-change-the-way-you-recruit-today
[https://perma.cc/3N4X-WEJD]; see also Roy Maurer, Using Data to Make Better Hires,
SHRM (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/talentacquisition/pages/using-data-make-better-hires.aspx [https://perma.cc/49DA-G2PP] (citing
Nathan R. Kuncel, Deniz S. Ones & David M. Klieger, In Hiring, Algorithms Beat Instinct,
HARV. BUS. REV., May 2014, https://hbr.org/2014/05/in-hiring-algorithms-beat-instinct
[https://perma.cc/5Y9P-C6XD]).
75. John Rossheim, Algorithmic Hiring: Why Hire by Numbers?, MONSTER,
https://hiring.monster.com/hr/hr-best-practices/recruiting-hiring-advice/strategic-workforceplanning/hiring-algorithms.aspx [https://perma.cc/7MD2-4F6J].
76. See Kuncel, Ones & Klieger, supra note 74.
77. Id.
78. See id. (“Our analysis of 17 studies of applicant evaluations shows that a simple
equation outperforms human decisions by at least 25%. The effect holds in any situation with
a large number of candidates, regardless of whether the job is on the front line, in middle
management, or (yes) in the C-suite.”).
79. See id.
80. Alex P. Miller, Want Less-Biased Decisions? Use Algorithms, HARV. BUS.
REV. (July 26, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/want-less-biased-decisions-use-algorithms
[https://perma.cc/J6YW-Y5Q9].
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that “[a]lgorithms are less biased and more accurate than the humans
they are replacing.” 81
Given these results, some legal scholars have challenged the focus
of legal scholarship on the bias discovered in automated decisionmaking. 82 As these scholars argue, the original intent of automated
decision-making is “to improve upon human decision-making by
suppressing biases to make the most efficient and least discriminatory
decisions.” 83 Thus, arguably, there is no implicit promise that
automated decision-making could eliminate all bias; rather, the
function of automated decision-making is merely to improve upon
human decision-making. This assertion should be accepted at face
value. My purpose for this Article is not to argue that automated
decision-making can or should eliminate all bias in decision-making;
rather, my aim is to argue that automated decision-making, even when
it does offer some improvement on human decision-making, still merits
legal oversight, 84 particularly when such decision-making holds the
potential to limit the access to earning a livelihood for people of
protected categories.
B. How Automated Is Automated Hiring?
Although this Article uses the term “automated hiring,” I contend
that this term can be misleading as it elides the continued role of human
input, the human hand. As I have previously noted, to argue against or
for automated decision-making versus human decision-making rests on
the false assumption that the two could be wholly disentangled. 85 As
Professor Mayson notes, automated decision-making is merely a
reflection of all past decisions:
All prediction functions like a mirror. . . . Algorithmic
prediction produces a precise reflection of digital data.
Subjective prediction produces a cloudy reflection of
anecdotal data. But the nature of the analysis is the
same. To predict the future under status quo
conditions is simply to project history forward. 86
I agree here with the conclusion that algorithmic decision-making
posits history as the best diviner of the future, but I also urge for a better
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519,
520 (2018).
83. Id. at 520.
84. Professor Julie Cohen has extensively made the point that automated systems merit
greater legal oversight in her breadth of scholarship. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 7.
85. Ajunwa, supra note 6, at 1711, 1718.
86. Mayson, supra note 4, at 2224.
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understanding of how human decision-making remains entangled in
automated decision-making. Such an understanding, I believe, would
help to quell the reification of automated decision-making as better than
human decision-making and also to negate what I call “automation
exceptionalism,” which is the idea that automated decision-making is
somehow set apart and should not be subjected to the same scrutiny or
skepticism as human decision-making.
To illustrate this point, I point to the example of Amazon’s
experience with one hiring algorithm. 87 In that case, a whistleblower
revealed that Amazon had created and then abandoned an automated
hiring system that was returning biased results for women candidates. 88
I cannot believe that Amazon would build an automated hiring system
to intentionally discriminate against women, yet that is alleged to have
happened in practice. 89
Most automated decision-making requires human input at some
stage. Some might argue that a crucial stage is ex post, when human
interveners may choose to ignore or make exceptions for the automated
result. However, note that for all automated decision-making, there is
always ex ante human input, when human decision-making directly
dictates the design of the automated decision-making system, including
deciding what variables should be considered, and deciding how said
variables should be measured. In the Amazon case, albeit that there was
no intention to discriminate, one possible cause for the discriminatory
results is human intervention in the way the computer models were
trained. 90 Thus, despite some of the proven benefits of automated
hiring, there remains the potential for misuse, resulting from the
opportunities to introduce human bias at any stage of the automated
hiring process — from design, to implementation, and finally, to the
interpretation of results.
C. Potential for Misuse
Although automated hiring offers some business utility, the
potential for the misuse of algorithmic hiring to accomplish
(un)intended unlawful discriminatory results remains. Hiring
87. Isobel Asher Hamilton, Amazon Built an AI Tool to Hire People but Had to Shut It
Down Because It Was Discriminating Against Women, INSIDER: BUS. (Oct. 10, 2018, 5:47
AM),
www.businessinsider.com/amazon-built-ai-to-hire-people-discriminated-againstwomen-2018-10 [https://perma.cc/VB44-Z95T].
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. (finding that the automated hiring system “reportedly downgraded résumés
containing the words ‘women’s’ and filtered out candidates who had attended two womenonly colleges”); see also Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias
Intervention, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1671, 1674 (2020) (describing the Amazon case and
noting “[a] potential cause: The computer models were trained on predominantly male
resumes, with the result that the system concluded that men were preferred candidates”).
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technologies can play various roles in the process; for example, in the
early stages of recruiting, automated predictions can “steer job
advertisements and personalized job recommendations to jobseekers
from particular demographic groups.” 91 Also, although employers
might adopt hiring technology to “increase efficiency, and in hopes that
they will find more successful — and sometimes, more diverse —
employees,” 92 this might be a superficial stop gap to addressing issues
of inequity embedded in organizational practices. Thus, the belief that
recruiters will be able to “make fairer and more holistic hiring
decisions” because the tools will “reduce bias by obscuring applicants’
sensitive characteristics,” 93 centers on individual human prejudice,
while obviating institutional, structural, and other forms of bias that
become systemic in any given organization. 94 To illustrate the
historical and structural nature of bias in hiring, consider this: “[A]
company that tends to hire from a privileged and homogeneous
community and then uses ‘culture fit’ as a factor in hiring decisions
could end up methodically rejecting otherwise qualified candidates
who come from more diverse backgrounds.” 95
The fact remains that there are myriad of ways that automated
hiring could systematically replicate biases that have calcified from
organizational practice. 96 First, if the training data for a model is itself
inaccurate, non-representative, or biased, the resulting model and the
predictions could reflect skewed results. 97 Second, a phenomenon
known as “automation bias” occurs when people “give undue weight to
the information coming through their monitors.” 98 A third issue is when
91. MIRANDA BOGEN & AARON RIEKE, UPTURN, HELP WANTED: AN EXAMINATION OF
HIRING ALGORITHMS, EQUITY, AND BIAS 3 (2018), https://www.upturn.org/
static/reports/2018/hiring-algorithms/files/Upturn%20--%20Help%20Wanted%20%20An%20Exploration%20of%20Hiring%20Algorithms,%20Equity%20and%20Bias.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BY4E-FXDL].
92. Id. at 6.
93. Id. at 7.
94. For example, Professor Pauline Kim argues: “algorithms will not counteract structural
forms of workplace bias.” Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, supra note 5, at 871.
95. BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 91, at 7.
96. As other scholars have argued: “It should not be surprising that trying to predict
qualities of good future workers based on the qualities of current workers and existing work
culture will not lead to change. In other words, people analytics runs the risk of homosocial
reproduction, or replacement of workers with workers that look like them, on a grand scale.”
Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia McCormack & Jintong Tang, The Law and
Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 961, 1013 (2017); see also Alan G. King &
Marko J. Mrkonich, “Big Data” and the Risk of Employment Discrimination, 68 OKLA. L.
REV. 555, 574 (2016) (“[I]f incumbents are older than applicants, then the social-media
profile of this older group may differ markedly from that of younger job applicants.
Accordingly, an algorithm highly accurate in sorting incumbents for their proficiency may
yield applicants notable only for their ‘retro’ tastes and lifestyles.”).
97. BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 91, at 8.
98. Id. at 9 (quoting Raja Parasuraman & Victor Riley, Humans and Automation: Use,
Misuse, Disuse, Abuse, 39 HUM. FACTORS 230 (1997)).
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algorithms are trained to evaluate the criteria used for selection in a
manner that benefits one group of applicants. This is especially true for
automated video interviewing which is the latest trend in automated
hiring.
Automated video interviews involve the video capture of the word
choices, speech patterns, and facial expressions of job applicants,
which is then used to evaluate their fit for a job position and their
cultural fit within the organization. 99 A survey of 506 companies in
2011 showed that 47% use video interviewing to shorten the hiring
timeframe and save costs, and 22% would consider it for interviewing
non-local candidates. 100 And more recently in 2018, 60% of
organizations surveyed confirmed that they are turning to video
interviews for recruitment. 101 For example, HireVue is one such
technology used to conduct virtual interviews, and the claim is that it
can identify facial expressions, vocal indications, word choice, and
more. 102 However, “[s]peech recognition software can perform poorly”
for certain groups of people if the algorithms have not been trained for
those groups, and “[f]acial analysis systems can struggle to read the
faces of women with darker skin.” 103 The legitimacy of considering
physical features and facial expressions as part of the hiring process is
questionable given a lack of scientific studies establishing any causal
relationship between those attributes and workplace success. 104
Yet, a cursory survey 105 shows that a wide range of companies are
already using automated video interviewing as part of their hiring
process:
(1)

HireVue: A pioneer in video interviewing and a platform for
applicant management, candidate assessment and video
interviewing that promises employer benefits of 24% cost

99. How AI Changes Recruiting Strategies Right Now, RECRUITMENT PROCESS
OUTSOURCING ASS’N (Oct. 10, 2019), https://blog.rpoassociation.org/blog/how-ai-changesrecruiting-strategies-right-now [https://perma.cc/2LCD-P8WF].
100. Heather O’Neill, Video Interviewing Cuts Costs, but Bias Worries Linger,
WORKFORCE.COM (Oct. 5, 2011), https://www.workforce.com/news/video-interviewingcuts-costs-but-bias-worries-linger [https://perma.cc/GB3G-FNMQ].
101. Nilam Oswal, The Latest Recruitment Technology Trends and How to Really Use
Them, PC WORLD (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/633219/latestrecruitment-technology-trends-how-really-use-them/ [https://perma.cc/HQ8Q-ZNKW].
102. See BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 91, at 36.
103. Id. at 37.
104. See id. at 37–38.
105. I also shared this survey in my written testimony to Congress. See The Future of Work:
Protecting Workers’ Rights in the Digital Age, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on C.R. and
Hum. Serv’s. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Lab., 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of Ifeoma
Ajunwa, then-Assistant Professor, Cornell University Industrial and Labor Relations School),
https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110438/witnesses/HHRG-116-ED07-WstateAjunwaJDPhDI-20200205.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XXK-GX5E].
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savings and 25–40% time savings. 106 HireVue claims that the
technology captures more than a million meaningful data
elements about a job candidate in each minute of video and
can tell managers things about candidates’ truthfulness and
confidence in answering questions. HireVue records
candidates’ responses to preset questions and then analyzes
and scores them based on tone, body language, and
keyword 107 and criteria that are proven to be predictive of job
performance. 108 This platform is mostly used by
organizations in retail, customer service, and hospitality for
volume hiring. HireVue now has more than six hundred
customers and has delivered more than five million video
interviews. 109
(2)

Talview: An AI-enabled video interviewing technology used
by many Fortune 500 companies and clients across more than
102 countries. 110 Popular clients include Amazon,
Cognizantt, Whirlpool, and Sephora, among others. 111

(3)

Spark Hire: A popular video interviewing software with
over 5,000 customers that uses on-demand video interviews
to screen job candidates and help recruiters identify the best
candidates for a job earlier in the hiring process. Popular
clients include the United States Postal Service, IKEA, and
Volkswagen. 112

(4)

Wepow: This technology allows employers to pre-record or
schedule live video interviews with candidates and compare
and rank them based on predefined criteria. It also analyzes
the recruitment process and highlights areas for

106. Janine Woodworth & Jake Bauer, Digital Interviewing: The Voice of the Candidate,
HIREVUE 7 (2014), http://www.thetalentboard.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/DigitalInterviewing-The-Voice-of-the-Candidate.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY2K-PJAG].
107. Dandan Chen, Pedro Galicia, Daniel Manjarrez & Lauren Sims, The Growing Role
of Technology in Talent Acquisition 4 (Feb. 2018) (MILR paper, Cornell University),
https://est05.esalestrack.com/esalestrack/Content/Content.ashx?aid=2181&system_filename
=58ee0e8c-aabf-412f-afbd-d5b34a20c727.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZTV6-JY5P].
108. Monika, Recruiting Software — All You Need to Know, HARVER (Aug. 23, 2019),
https://harver.com/blog/recruiting-software/ [https://perma.cc/QCG2-3346].
109. Josh Bersin, AI Comes to Recruiting: Will Interviews Go the Way of the Dinosaur?,
JOSH BERSIN (Nov. 7, 2018), https://joshbersin.com/2018/11/ai-comes-to-recruiting-willinterviews-go-the-way-of-the-dinosaur/ [https://perma.cc/U873-WZWH].
110. Top 40+ Pre-Employment Assessment Tools, ACADEMY TO INVIGORATE HR (AIHR)
DIGITAL (July 2020), https://www.digitalhrtech.com/top-pre-employment-assessment-tools/
[https://perma.cc/A22R-43NP].
111. Customers, TALVIEW, https://www.talview.com/customers [https://perma.cc/KA5UA448].
112. Hear It from Our Happy Customers, SPARK HIRE, https://www.sparkhire.com/
customers [https://perma.cc/BAN5-HFWR].

No. 2]

Auditing Imperative

639

improvement. Top customers include Heineken, Genentech,
Virgin Atlantic, Walmart, Adidas, and many more. 113
The use of automated interviewing is legally fraught for several
reasons. First, algorithms have “limited ability to parse the nuanced
meaning of human communication.” 114 Second, such checks could
“surface details about an applicant’s race, sexual identity, disability,
pregnancy, or health status, which employers should not consider
during the hiring process.” 115 And third, the training of such algorithms
could skew the results for protected classes given that many software
engineers are white males, and thus tend to use white male faces and
voices as their training models. 116
Beyond evaluation, automated hiring provides other opportunities
for human bias to creep in. For example, as the last step of the hiring
process, employers make offers to applicants using automated hiring
systems. The software programs predict the likelihood a candidate will
accept a job offer, and what the employer can do to increase the rate of
acceptance. The employer can “adjust salary, bonus, stock options, and
other benefits to see in real time how the prediction changes.” 117
Although these functions could be helpful for an effective hiring
process, they might also amplify pay gaps for women and minority job
candidates. 118 Such predictive salary offers also undermine “laws that
bar employers from considering candidates’ salary histories.” 119
As Rachel Goodman of the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) writes, the flaws of automated hiring remain because of
limitations in the law. For one, although vendors who market the hiring
tools claim that these hiring tools are less biased than humans, the
software is proprietary, and there is currently no way to verify these
claims. 120 This lack of transparency makes it difficult for job applicants
to bring suit based on a disparate impact theory in “failure-to-hire”
113. Your Success Is Our Success . . . We Power You, WEPOW, https://www.wepow.com/
en/customers [https://perma.cc/CP4L-MAA7].
114. BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 91, at 40 (quoting Natasha Duarte, Emma Llanso & Anna
Loup, Mixed Messages? The Limits of Automated Social Media Content Analysis, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. 3 (Nov. 2017), https://cdt.org/files/2017/11/Mixed-MessagesPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPU5-294N]).
115. Id.
116. See Kari Paul, ‘Disastrous’ Lack of Diversity in AI Industry Perpetuates Bias, Study
Finds, GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2019/apr/16/artificial-intelligence-lack-diversity-new-york-university-study
[https://perma.cc/H2TN-4V32].
117. BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 91, at 41.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. Rachel Goodman, Why Amazon’s Automated Hiring Tool Discriminated Against
Women, AM. C.L. UNION (Oct. 12, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womensrights/womens-rights-workplace/why-amazons-automated-hiring-tool-discriminated-against
[https://perma.cc/UW9P-QSBJ].
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cases, as applicants are unable to identify a policy or practice that led
to their rejection. 121 One suggestion is that “outside auditors may be
able to uncover bias.” 122 However, such research by outside auditors is
thwarted by various obstacles, one of them being that federal laws, such
as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, may criminalize certain types
of testing of employment websites for discrimination. 123 Given these
obstacles, there are calls for the EEOC to expand its efforts to govern
workplace algorithms. 124 Later, I will outline some federal measures
that could provide true protections for job applicants subjected to an
automated hiring regime. 125 But first, I will parse some other solutions
that I think fall short of the ultimate goal of equal opportunity for all
job applicants.

III. EX MACHINA: TECHNO-SOLUTIONIST APPROACHES
Even as legal scholars have called for more transparency 126 and
accountability 127 for machine learning algorithms, increasingly,
attention has shifted towards technological approaches to combating
algorithmic capture in employment. These techno-solutionist
approaches generally fall into two categories: (1) the adjustment of
human job search behavior to “game” machine learning algorithms and
(2) the creation of new algorithms that promise to eliminate bias. This
section notes the limitations of such approaches and cautions that
techno-solutionist approaches will never be effective for problems that
are, at their root, derived from socio-technical interactions arising from
structural bias and societal prejudices.

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.; Sandvig v. Barr — Challenge to CFAA Prohibition on Uncovering Racial
Discrimination Online, AM. C.L. UNION (May 22, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/
cases/sandvig-v-barr-challenge-cfaa-prohibition-uncovering-racial-discrimination-online
[https://perma.cc/6ASQ-A2WS].
124. See Goodman, supra note 120.
125. See infra Section V.B.
126. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1269
(2020) (“These features . . . have prompted calls for new mechanisms of transparency and
accountability in the age of algorithms.”); Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic
Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 132 (2018) (“Such
accountability requires not perfect transparency . . . but . . . meaningful transparency.”); see
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 25 (2014) (discussing the need for oversight of algorithms);
Alyssa M. Carlson, The Need for Transparency in the Age of Predictive Sentencing
Algorithms, 103 IOWA L. REV. 303, 326 (2017) (arguing that transparency increases
accuracy); Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright
Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473, 482 (2016) (discussing the lack of transparency
in algorithms).
127. See, e.g., Kroll et al., supra note 21, at 636.
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A. Humans Conform to the Machine
One approach to counteracting the biased effects of hiring
algorithms is to cheat the system. Thus, humans devise strategies to
hurdle routine machine learning errors and other encoded biases. In a
recent LinkedIn article, a recruiting manager counseled job applicants
on how to avoid getting axed by the applicant tracking system
(“ATS”). 128 The article provides advice ranging from appropriate file
format for resumes (PDFs are difficult for hiring algorithms to read), to
the idea of choosing keywords pulled from the job advertisement to
ensure that an unsophisticated algorithm does not reject the application
simply because the algorithm was designed to only recognize a narrow
list of words provided for in a keyword search. 129
In a similar vein, there are online communities dedicated to
cheating the personality tests that have now become ubiquitous features
of automated hiring. 130 Although some question the reliability of
personality tests, 131 the tests remain a popular part of automated hiring
systems. Some experts have estimated that “as many as 60 percent of
workers are now asked to take workplace assessments” and that “[t]he
$500-million-a-year industry has grown by about 10 percent annually
in recent years.” 132 While many organizations use personality testing
for career development, about 22% use it to evaluate job candidates,
according to the results of a 2014 survey of 344 Society for Human
Resource Management members. 133 While some lawsuits have sought
to eliminate the tests, most workers have resigned themselves to
encountering the test as part of the hiring process and have come to rely
on online “answer keys” created to beat the tests. 134 These “answer
keys,” however, represent conformity to the unfair practices of
automated hiring, rather than a true protest of their potential to
discriminate in insidious ways. That is, efforts to cheat or beat the
system merely represent the acquiescence of humans to a regime of
128. Jan Tegze, Modifying Your Resume to Beat ATS Algorithms, LINKEDIN (Sept. 10,
2015),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/modifying-your-resume-beat-ats-algorithmsjan-tegze/ [https://perma.cc/HM2B-2VUD].
129. Id.
130. See Melanie Shebel, Unicru Personality Test Answer Key: Read This and Get Hired,
TOUGH
NICKEL
(May
8,
2018),
https://toughnickel.com/finding-job/Unicru
[https://perma.cc/4DPV-MEAK]; Timothy Horrigan, Some Answers to Unicru Personality
Test, TIMOTHY HORRIGAN (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.timothyhorrigan.com/
documents/unicru-personality-test.answer-key.html [https://perma.cc/72D8-LYU4].
131. See, e.g., Gill Plimmer, How to Cheat a Psychometric Test, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2014),
https://www.ft.com/content/eeda84e4-b4f6-11e3-9166-00144feabdc0
[https://perma.cc/LDH9-7Z6Z].
132. Dori Meinert, What Do Personality Tests Really Reveal?, SOC’Y FOR HUM.
RESOURCE MGMT. (June 1, 2015), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/pages/
0615-personality-tests.aspx [https://perma.cc/3S6U-HZDB].
133. Id.
134. See Shebel, supra note 130.
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algorithmically derived worker selection that is fundamentally unfair to
protected categories of workers. 135
B. Algorithms to the Rescue
Another technological approach is the development of new
algorithmic hiring tools that purport to eliminate biases. A recent swell
of start-ups 136 are hawking new ways to automate hiring. Some of these
companies also claim that their technological approaches ensure
employment decisions that are non-discriminatory. 137 Although these
start-ups may very well have the good intention of eliminating human
bias in hiring, I argue that the lack of any established internal or external
auditing protocols means that those good intentions cannot be verified
in practice, and I remain steadfast in my belief that any solely technosolutionist attempts at a solution without legal oversight will fall short.
Thus, calls for improving the transparency of algorithms do not
adequately address the full scope of the problem.
Legal scholars have called for greater transparency for hiring
algorithms, 138 with the belief that “greater disclosure of how
[algorithms] operate” will help avoid unfairness. 139 Professor Frank
Pasquale suggests that a solution to the problem of algorithmic
discrimination is transparency; he uses the metaphor of the “black box”
and proposes that algorithms should not operate as black boxes but
should be opened up for examination. 140 However, some argue that this
call for transparency is not sufficient for algorithms to be completely
fair in regard to legal standards. 141 This is because transparency alone
does not fully explain why a particular decision was made or how fairly
the system operates. 142 Rather, those scholars argue that governing
135. See infra Section III.C.
136. See, e.g., HIREVUE, http://hirevue.com [https://perma.cc/YU54-6ZK7].
137. Aarti Shahani, Now Algorithms Are Deciding Whom to Hire, Based on Voice, NPR:
ALL TECH CONSIDERED (Mar. 23, 2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
alltechconsidered/2015/03/23/394827451/now-algorithms-are-deciding-whom-to-hirebased-on-voice [https://perma.cc/B68N-FLWF].
138. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 126, at 24–25.
139. Auditing Algorithms, supra note 21, at 189.
140. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Bittersweet Mysteries of Machine Learning (A
Provocation), LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI.: MEDIA POL’Y PROJECT (Feb. 5, 2016),
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2016/02/05/bittersweet-mysteries-of-machinelearning-a-provocation/ [https://perma.cc/72CC-PQTE]; see also Anupam Chander, The
Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1039 (2017).
141. See Kroll et al., supra note 21, at 633.
142. As some scholars have noted, the need for explainability is especially important in the
context of automated hiring. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann & David Westreich,
Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 164, 177 (2017) (“Applicants
who are judged and found wanting deserve a better explanation than, ‘The computer said
so.’”); Andrew Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2018) (noting that “algorithmic decision-making has become
synonymous with inexplicable decision-making”).
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algorithms requires design principles that provide checks for bias.
Professor Joshua A. Kroll and his co-authors suggest technical
strategies that would help overcome hidden biases in the algorithms. 143
For instance, they suggest incorporating randomness to maximize the
gain of learning from experience; if the hiring algorithms are random
such that they hire some candidates who are not predicted to do well,
“the validity of the initial assumptions can be tested and the accuracy
and fairness of the whole system will benefit over time.” 144
Professors Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst join this debate to
note that the inscrutability and the nonintuitive nature of machine
learning algorithms are both factors in automated decision-making.
They define “inscrutability” as “a situation in which the rules that
govern decision-making are so complex, numerous, and interdependent
that they defy practical inspection and resist comprehension.” 145 The
legal problem with inscrutability, I argue, is that ultimately it muddles
any attempt to determine intent. In addition to inscrutability which
becomes an issue when machine learning algorithms are creating de
novo rules on their own, another important problem is the non-intuitive
nature of automated decision-making. As the authors note, the human
need to understand the intuitive relationship between any given
automated decision and the underlying data is “not the demand for
disclosure or accessible explanations; it is a demand that decisionmaking rely on reasoning that comports with intuitive understanding of
the phenomenon in question.” 146 I argue that this human need for
“intuitive understanding” is a desire for justice, rather than a quest for
technical redress. There is both a human need to understand the factors
under which one is judged (especially for access to livelihood) and a
desire to see factors done away with that do not conform to principles
of fairness.
A recent Illinois law represents one attempt at transparency for
automated hiring and also highlights the limitations of that approach.
Effective January 1, 2020, the Artificial Intelligence Video Interview
Act (“AIVIA”) 147 is the governing law in Illinois for any employer who
chooses to “use artificial intelligence (AI) to analyze video interview
by job candidates.” 148 Under AIVIA, employers are required to provide
advance notice to the applicant of the use of the video interview
technology, and further to “explain to the applicant ‘how the [AI]
143. See Kroll et al., supra note 21, at 640.
144. Id. at 684.
145. Selbst & Barocas, supra note 142, at 1094.
146. Id. at 1097.
147. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 42 (2020).
148. Nicole Mormilo, Matthew Jedreski, K.C. Halm & Jeffrey S. Bosley, Employers Using
AI in Hiring Take Note: Illinois’ Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act Is Now in Effect,
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/artificialintelligence-law-advisor/2020/02/illinois-aivia-compliance [https://perma.cc/JL6E-RUQZ].
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works’ and what general characteristics the technology uses to evaluate
applicants.” 149 This call for transparency is facially valuable. 150
However, many AI video analytics providers do not publish adequate
information on the workings of their products. Thus, the effects of this
part of the law may take one of two paths: Either AI video providers
will be forced to publish more information about their algorithms or the
standard for meeting this transparency mandate will be effectively so
low as to become meaningless.
Beyond transparency, the law requires that employers “obtain, in
advance, the applicant’s consent to use the technology.” 151 The law also
features provisions for data protection. It imposes limits on “the
distribution and sharing of the video,” granting access “only to those
persons ‘whose expertise or technology’ is necessary to evaluate the
applicant.” 152 Further, candidates are given some control over what
happens to the video after their assessment. Employers are required to
“destroy the video (and all backup copies) within 30 days” of the
applicant requesting its destruction. 153
The law firm Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP (“DWT”) identifies a
few key issues with the law. Chiefly, the law fails to define “artificial
intelligence” and “artificial intelligence analysis” along with other key
terms. 154 This ambiguity may mean that certain employer AI use cases,
such as “to track data about its candidates,” may not be covered. 155
Further, ambiguity in the transparency mandate of the law may, as
suggested above, pose serious problems for its effective use. DWT
notes that the law does not go in depth to specify “how much detail an
employer must provide when ‘explaining how artificial intelligence
works’ to an applicant” or what “‘characteristics’ of the AI employers
must disclose.” 156 Therefore, employers may be permitted to use broad,
cursory statements such as “AI will assess a candidate’s performance”
to satisfy this requirement, statements which do not serve the true spirit
of transparency. DWT finds the law to be unclear in several other
aspects as well. It notes that there is no requirement that candidates
provide express written consent. 157 Further, the law “does not include
a private right of action or any explicit penalties,” which could raise
149. Matthew Jedreski, Jeffrey S. Bosley & K.C. Halm, Illinois Becomes First State to
Regulate Employers’ Use of Artificial Intelligence to Evaluate Video Interviews, DAVIS
WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/artificial-intelligencelaw-advisor/2019/09/illinois-becomes-first-state-to-regulate-employers
[https://perma.cc/46JD-2T32].
150. See infra Section IV.B.
151. Jedreski, Bosley & Halm, supra note 149.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Mormilo, Jedreski, Bosley & Halm, supra note 148.
157. See Jedreski, Bosley & Halm, supra note 149.
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serious issues in enforcing its provisions. 158 As for data destruction,
DWT points out that it is not clear if “data that an employer extracts or
derives from the video interview . . . is subject to the destruction duty
under the law.” 159 If such data is not protected by the AIVIA, then the
extent to which the act allows candidates control over their interview
data is potentially limited. Lastly, DWT points out that “there is no
guidance on what it means for a job to be ‘based in’ Illinois, and the
statute is silent as to whether employees may refuse to consider
applicants who refuse to consent.” 160
Ultimately, AIVIA is a step in the right direction, as it touches on
the serious concerns of transparency and data rights. However, the
primary, overarching issue with the law is its lack of specificity. Failing
to define key terms, to expand on essential provisions, or to stipulate
any enforcement mechanism means that the effective impact of the
transparency and data rights measures is limited, and employers who
wish to evade the law may do so. Further, while some employers may
surely make a good faith effort to comply, many employers themselves
are not privy to how the AI they use truly works. Companies such as
HireVue keep a close guard over their algorithms and technologies to
protect their market share, to the detriment of clients and candidates
alike. 161 In order to push AI video interview companies to be more
transparent, the law must put in place effective penalties such that
employers would not choose to use technology unless AI companies
provided enough information. Effective legislation must hold enough
weight to impact all stakeholders in the AI video interview universe.
Again, it is important to reiterate that Illinois is “at the forefront of
regulating technology and personal data.” 162 AIVIA should be
commended as first-of-its-kind legislation that is shedding light on
critical issues of public interest. It simply needs to go further to
counterbalance the immense power which the AI sphere currently
holds.
C. The Perils of Techno-Solutionism
In the specific case of automated hiring systems, techno-solutionist
methods fail to address the bias encoded in the business practices
deployed in the hiring process. In fact, those methods may even serve
to replicate the shortcomings of human decision-making processes in
hiring. For example, although the websites providing “answer keys” to
beat employment personality tests may help a handful of people who
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See infra Section IV.B.
162. Jedreski, Bosley & Halm, supra note 149.
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would otherwise have been rejected, they also ultimately serve to reify
the personality tests as part of the job application process and to calcify
the same practice as part of business procedure for employers to screen
applicants. In effect, such resistance efforts may be futile attempts to
combat “algorithmic governmentality,” which as one scholar has
argued “anticipates our every move, mapping out in advance an
apolitical ideal of behaviour and performance . . . to which the subject
must adapt and conform without reflection.” 163 This suggests a need for
remedies that do not unquestioningly privilege technological
innovation, but which uphold the goals of antidiscrimination laws
through careful legal oversight. As other scholars have noted, technosolutionist approaches to societal problems are foiled by the “bias in,
bias out” problem. 164 That is, techno-solutionist approaches that fail to
take into account structural biases encoded in the algorithm or which
fail to question the provenance of training data and how they might bear
the taint of historical inequities are doomed to replicate the same biased
results.

IV. DO EMPLOYMENT LAWS ADEQUATELY ADDRESS
AUTOMATED HIRING?
In this section, I discuss the limitations of employment law in
protecting job applicants who experience an adverse impact from
automated hiring systems. I review employment law scholarship that
offers empirical evidence of the difficulty of proving employment
discrimination based on a disparate impact cause of action and the
theories proffered by legal scholars as to why this might be the case.
Given that the means of proving discrimination by automated hiring
systems remains solely under the control of employers, I argue that
there is a necessity for compulsory data retention by employers making
use of automated hiring systems and that, furthermore, such data
retention should facilitate both mandated and voluntary audits. 165
Finally, I note the potential for trade secret law to be used as a shield
against such audits, and I argue that audits by an independent auditing
body would serve to allay any fears as to the misuse of proprietary
information. These measures will aid in data retention to help compile
the statistical proof required by disparate impact claimants, and an
163. Douglas Spencer, Proletarianisation Isn’t Working, RADICAL PHIL. (Feb. 2018),
https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/reviews/individual-reviews/proletarianisation-isntworking [https://perma.cc/E3JC-9S52].
164. Mayson, supra note 4, at 2224; Robert Brauneis & Ellen Goodman, Algorithmic
Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 122 (2018); see Anjanette H.
Raymond, Emma Arrington Stone Young & Scott J. Shackelford, Building a Better HAL
9000: Algorithms, the Market, and the Need to Prevent the Engraining of Bias, 15 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 222 (2018).
165. See infra Part V.
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independent external auditing mandate would help to maintain the
intellectual property law shield for proprietary automated systems.
They will also level the field for disparate impact claimants and
eliminate the current Sisyphean climb to proving discrimination on the
basis of disparate impact.
A. The Uphill Climb for Disparate Impact Claims
As several legal scholars have demonstrated through empirical
data, plaintiffs aiming to bring an employment discrimination claim on
a theory of disparate impact, rather than disparate treatment, face an
uphill battle. 166 Professor Michael Selmi assesses the disparate impact
theory’s legacy. 167 Based on an extensive empirical analysis of court
cases, his article employs detailed statistics to demonstrate the
difficulty of proving disparate impact cases. 168 The disparate impact
theory initially arose to deal with specific practices, such as seniority
systems and written tests, that were perpetuating intentional
discrimination. 169 Even though courts have not restricted the theory to
those particular contexts, it has “proved an ill fit for any challenge other
than to written examinations.” 170
Selmi finds that the Supreme Court “had rejected more challenges
than it had accepted, and it had largely limited the theory to its
origins — namely testing claims and perhaps some other objective
procedures capable of formal validation,” by the end of the first decade
of disparate impact theory. 171 The following two decades further
confirmed the theory’s limited reach. 172 This limited reach is
“particularly significant,” considering that employment discrimination
claims in general are already “notoriously difficult to prove.” 173 Selmi
notes that “if intentional discrimination is difficult to prove with
existing circumstantial evidence,” it will be even more difficult for
society to accept unintended negatives effects as racism.” 174 Based on
the belief that the disparate impact theory was a mistake, Selmi suggests
that a broader judicial definition of intent would have “opened our eyes
to the persistence of discrimination in a way that the disparate impact
theory could not.” 175
166. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace
Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 989 (2005).
167. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701
(2006).
168. See id. at 734–39.
169. See id. at 705.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 733.
172. Id. at 734.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 768.
175. Id. at 782.
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Similarly, Professor Sandra Sperino provides exhaustive case law
evidence of a defendant-friendly bias to the adjudication of disparate
impact cases and discusses the development of disparate impact
theory. 176 For example, the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. recognized the disparate impact theory of employment
discrimination under Title VII by indicating that “good intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’
for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.” 177
Later, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the Court “tipp[ed] the
scales in favor of employers” by “placing the burden of persuasion on
the plaintiff and by requiring the employer only to articulate a
legitimate reason for its conduct.” 178 Moreover in Smith v. City of
Jackson, the Supreme Court, while recognizing that disparate impact is
a viable claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (“ADEA”), 179 “affirmed the dismissal of the petitioners’ claims,
finding that they had not produced enough evidence to prevail on a
disparate impact claim.” 180 According to Justice O’Connor, the Court
in Wards Cove Packing signaled a defendant-friendly analysis by first
requiring the plaintiff to establish that the application of a particular
employment practice created a disparate impact, then requiring the
employer to produce evidence that “its action was based on a
reasonable nonage factor,” and lastly mandating the plaintiff to bear the
burden of disproving the company’s assertion. 181
Sperino notes that, in reality, disparate impact claims appear to
have been disfavored even before the Smith case. 182 Litigants arguing
a disparate impact case “face significant initial costs that are either
absent or are less significant in a disparate treatment case”; “the
reliance on statistical evidence requires plaintiffs to obtain large
amounts of data from the defendant and other sources.” 183 Furthermore,
the necessary evidence required by the plaintiff “is largely in the hands
of the defendant and must be sought through the discovery process.”184
Because defendants are often reluctant to produce the information

176. Sandra F. Sperino, Disparate Impact or Negative Impact?: The Future of NonIntentional Discrimination Claims Brought by the Elderly, 13 ELDER L.J. 339 (2005).
177. Id. at 348 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
178. Id. at 349 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 673 (1989)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
179. Id. at 354 (citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 228 (2005)).
180. Id. (quoting Smith, 544 U.S. at 242).
181. See id. at 359 (citing Smith, 544 U.S. at 252 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
182. See id. at 359–60.
183. Id. at 360.
184. Id. at 360–61.
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voluntarily, the process of collecting and analyzing statistical evidence
is “both complex and arduous.” 185
Both Selmi’s and Sperino’s research offers grist for a re-imagining
of redress mechanisms for employment discrimination. First, I concur
with Selmi’s conclusions here regarding the need for a more expansive
definition of intent in proving employment discrimination cases. This
is why, in another article, I have proposed a new theory of action,
discrimination per se, which takes into account the particular
difficulties of proof presented when a plaintiff is seeking to challenge
an employer’s use of an automated hiring system for employment
discrimination. 186 Discrimination per se would effectively operate as a
third cause of action under Title VII. 187 Per my proposal,
a plaintiff can assert that a hiring practice (for
example, the use of proxy variables in automated
hiring resulting in or with the potential to result in
adverse impact to protected categories) is so
egregious as to amount to discrimination per se, and
this would shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff
to the defendant (employer) to show that its practice
is non-discriminatory. 188
This burden-shifting eliminates the uphill climb confronting disparate
impact claimants during which they must procure sufficient statistical
evidence of disproportionate impact.
However, even with the proposed theory of discrimination per se
as help for the plaintiff, Sperino’s point that plaintiffs of employment
discrimination cases are disadvantaged by the necessary reliance on the
employer to provide the very data they need to prove their case still
stands. A major thread that runs through the dismissed cases on
automated hiring is the court’s finding of a lack of evidence or the
inability of the plaintiff to provide proof of their allegations of
discrimination.
Consider the case of Gladden v. Bolden. 189 Warren Gladden, an
African American male, filed suit against NASA alleging race and age
185. Id. at 361 (quoting Hill v. Miss. State Emp’t Serv., 918 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir.
1990).
186. See Ajunwa, supra note 6, at 1727–28.
187. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects the job applicant against
discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, and religion. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e–2000e-17. Plaintiffs must establish that “a respondent uses a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of [a protected characteristic] and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with its business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
188. Ajunwa, supra note 6, at 1728.
189. 802 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D.D.C. 2011).
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discrimination in violation of Title VII and ADEA. 190 He argued that
the automated hiring system used by NASA, Resumix, had a selection
process that was discriminatory as his resume was not moved forward
in the hiring process even though he claimed he had “extensive”
experience. 191 However, NASA testified that the Resumix system did
not take race, gender, or age into account when it was analyzing and
scoring resumes. 192 The court thus dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint,
citing a lack of evidence. 193
In yet another case, Vazirabadi v. Denver Health, 194 the plaintiff
Alireza Vazirabadi brought suit against Denver Health alleging
discrimination on the basis of age and national origin. Vazirabadi
alleged that he had selected “yes” for a voluntary question on the online
application which asked if he was more than forty years old. 195 Also,
another question on the online application form asked about foreign
language skills, and he had indicated that he was fluent in Farsi. 196
Vazirabadi submitted a charge of discrimination with the EEOC when
he was not hired and the company hired a 34-year-old Caucasian and a
28-year-old Hispanic, for the two positions he had applied for. 197 The
court found, however, that Vazirabadi had not provided sufficient
evidence to support his claim, and that his allegations were based
“solely on conjecture.” 198 Thus, the court approved the hospital’s
motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. 199
The difficulties of proof for applicants regarding discrimination via
automated hiring systems are further exacerbated by intellectual
property law and the CFAA.
B. Intellectual Property Law and the CFAA
Any attempt by plaintiffs to access proof of discrimination in
automated hiring systems may be stymied by extant laws, such as
intellectual property law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(“CFAA”), both of which have been invoked by the makers of
automated decision-making systems as shields to scrutiny. 200
190. Id. at 210.
191. Id. at 211.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 214–15.
194. Vazirabadi v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., No. 17-cv-01737, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 229111, at *2–3 (D. Colo. Oct. 11, 2018).
195. Id. at *2.
196. See id.
197. Id. at *2–3.
198. Id. at *24.
199. See id. at *25.
200. As an example of intellectual property law, Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) creates liability for hacking or reverse engineering an automated
system protected under copyright law. 17 U.S.C. § 1201; see also Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra
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Corporations, claiming trade secret, have invoked intellectual property
law to prevent the disclosure of information related to their proprietary
algorithms. 201 Similarly, the CFAA could be read to protect automated
systems from outside audits with the argument that such audits violate
the terms of service for the systems. 202 Although the ACLU has brought
suit on behalf of several academic researchers aiming to audit such
systems and has alleged that the CFAA is unconstitutionally
overbroad, 203 there has yet to be a proposed solution to the argument
that trade secret laws may also serve as an impediment to the auditing
of decision-making algorithms. 204
Similarly, Professors Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale discuss
the concerns about the disparate impact of machine learning algorithms
and the attendant calls for transparency. 205 They claim that the
argument against opacity as “right to an explanation” under the General
Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) of the European Union is
note 126, at 526 (noting the chilling effect on researchers who would like to reverse engineer
automated processes, given the potential to incur liabilities); Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty,
and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1343, 1395 (2018); Rebecca Wexler, When a Computer Program Keeps You in Jail, N.Y.
TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/how-computers-areharming-criminal-justice.html [https://perma.cc/BMW4-XPQ6]; Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue
Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 19, 43
(2017) (discussing how trade secret law can protect policing algorithms from scrutiny); Sonia
Katyal, supra note 4, at 117 (discussing the same and suggesting a whistleblowing framework
to enable disclosure of biased algorithms).
201. For example, Nicole Wong, in her role as Google’s Associate General Counsel, has
stated that “Google avidly protects every aspect of its search technology from disclosure.”
Nicole Wong, Response to the DoJ Motion, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Feb. 17, 2006),
https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/02/response-to-doj-motion.html
[https://perma.cc/SC5K-72T8].
202. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). Circuits have interpreted the CFAA in divergent ways.
Compare Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. Carmicle, 846 F.3d 1167, 1174–75 (11th Cir. 2017), and
United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010), and Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v.
Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006), and EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc.,
274 F.3d 577, 582–84 (1st Cir. 2001) (adopting a broad interpretation of “exceed[ing]
authorized access”), with United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 528 (2d Cir. 2015), and United
States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2012), and WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC
v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a broader interpretation). And despite
its holding in Nosal rejecting a broad interpretation of the CFAA, the Ninth Circuit recently
held that continuing to access a website after receiving a cease-and-desist letter created
liability under the CFAA. Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th
Cir. 2016) (“But when Facebook sent the cease-and-desist letter, Power, as it conceded, knew
that it no longer had permission to access Facebook’s computers at all. Power, therefore,
knowingly accessed and without permission took, copied, and made use of Facebook’s
data.”). The Supreme Court recently denied Power Ventures’ petition for certiorari, Power
Ventures, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017) (mem.); Power Ventures would have
provided the Court with its first opportunity to bridge the gulf between broad and narrow
interpretations of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
203. See Complaint at 4, Sandvig v. Lynch, No. 16-cv-01368 (D.D.C. June 29, 2016).
204. Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets, supra note 200, at 1429.
205. Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm: Why a Right to an
Explanation Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18,
19–22 (2017).
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ineffective and blocks the ability for recourse. 206 The authors also
suggest the need for “subject-centric” explanations, which focus on a
select region of a model, as explanation systems, because such
explanations can not only reveal more but could also circumvent any
developer’s intellectual property or trade secret concerns. 207
Given that it would take time to carve out exceptions to intellectual
property law and the CFAA framework, 208 I argue then, that as a
pragmatic matter, an independent third-party auditor, that pledges to
keep secret any trade secret information it obtains in the auditing
process, and which is buoyed by the labor market preferences of job
applicants, may afford a more immediate approach to addressing the
issues of transparency and accountability for automated hiring systems.
C. Recognizing an Affirmative Duty
I argue here that any affirmative duty of care imposed on an
employer should carry also an auditing imperative for automated hiring
systems. But first: Is there an affirmative duty of care for employers?
From what legal basis is this duty of care derived?
Over the last several decades, legal scholars have begun calling for
the application of tort law to the framework through which we
understand employment discrimination. Professor David Benjamin
Oppenheimer first noted that the Supreme Court’s primary theories of
employment discrimination could readily be analogized to intentional
tort and strict liability doctrines. 209 Then, Oppenheimer elaborates on
this analogy, arguing that employment discrimination can most aptly
be compared to the tort doctrine of negligence. 210
First, Oppenheimer argues that the theory of unconscious racism
must be applied to employment discrimination. 211 Through this theory,
Oppenheimer explains that racist acts are often the product of
unconscious bias and stereotyping — not conscious decisions. 212 As
206. Id. at 44.
207. Id. at 56–57.
208. Note that one scholar advocates for exceptions to copyright law that would allow for
scrutiny of decision-making algorithms by third parties without violating the CFAA and also
allow for otherwise copyrighted material to be used as part of the training data for algorithmic
systems. Amanda Levendowki, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit
Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 594–96 (2018). My approach focuses on the idea of a
certified third-party auditor that would alleviate the concerns regarding proprietary
information and does not necessarily require a change in existing framework — a fraught and
contentious process. See infra Section V.
209. See Negligent Discrimination, supra note 28, at 899.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 900–01.
212. Id. In fact, a person’s attempt to understand his or her relationship to the world often
necessarily means the person must categorize other individuals and draw comparisons
between himself or herself and others. Id. at 901. People learn this skill from a very young
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such, humans may not even be aware that they are making such
judgments, while their actions still reflect their unconscious
perceptions. 213 Effectively, this opens the door for people to have
unconscious biases that impact others in a negative way. 214
Oppenheimer then parallels this notion to the idea of employment
discrimination, arguing that employers may not consciously hold racist
or discriminatory views, but nonetheless discriminate in their conduct
towards employees. 215 He observes a swift upward trend towards most
white Americans professing a commitment to nondiscrimination in
employment. 216 Yet, Title VII and other statutory prohibitions of race
discrimination are still necessary because racism is often an
unconscious bias. 217 Furthermore, supporting the principle of
nondiscrimination in employment does not necessarily mean that all
white Americans are also in support of federal enforcement of
employment discrimination laws. 218 In fact, based on one study,
Oppenheimer suggests that 97% of the support for nondiscrimination is
an “empty gesture,” meaning white Americans often do not back up the
“support” they suggest in surveys. 219 Similarly, while many white
Americans had attested that they were committed to nondiscrimination,
they were similarly more likely to describe African Americans as being
more “lazy” and less “honest” than other Americans. 220 Using these
studies, Oppenheimer concludes that white Americans are frequently
unaware of their own internal racism. 221
Oppenheimer then argues that a theory of employment
discrimination that focuses on intent to discriminate can provide no
remedy for most discrimination, because there often is no intent
involved. 222 The intent requirement is ultimately based on a false
binary — “[w]hen Congress enacted Title VII it provided little
guidance on the standard that courts should require for proof of
discrimination.” 223 The Supreme Court supplemented this by dividing
discrimination cases into claims that looked like intentional torts, and
others that looked more like strict liability. 224
age, such that making snap judgments about others becomes part of the way their brains work.
Id. at 902.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 903.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 905.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 910.
221. Id. at 916.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 919.
224. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (explaining that
where an employee challenges a specific employment decision, she must prove it was
motivated by an intent to discriminate); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
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With this in mind, Oppenheimer provides an analysis of Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., a case applying the strict liability employment law
theory. 225 Here, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the
“consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.”226
As such, it found that the employer was strictly liable for its unintended
but harmful conduct, without using the words “strict liability.” 227
Next, Oppenheimer delves into the idea of the intentional tort,
which presented itself in the McDonnell Douglas case. 228 In this case,
the Supreme Court held that in an individual discrimination case, the
plaintiff must prove an intent to discriminate by showing, for example,
that “she was qualified for an open job which remained open after her
rejection.” 229 After this point, employers can defend themselves by
showing that there was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for their
decisions. 230
Yet the Supreme Court began to articulate a third approach to the
adverse impact and strict liability doctrines — the less discriminatory
alternative doctrine. 231 In these cases, a plaintiff could prevail if she
could show that “other selection devices without a similar
discriminatory effect would also serve the employer’s legitimate
interest.” 232 Oppenheimer argues that this test opened the door for the
application of the doctrine of negligence to employment discrimination
case. 233 He explains that “[n]egligence, at its core, is the breach of a
duty recognized by law for the protection of others.” 234 Employers
often have this duty — for example, the duty to provide a safe
workplace or to protect employees from unfit co-employees or
supervisors. 235 Then, he argues that the employment relationship is a
“special relationship,” such that both employees and employers enter
into the employment relationship with care and owe each other certain
duties. 236 Here, employers could be responsible for not protecting
employees from discriminatory practices. 237
(explaining that where an employee challenges policies or procedures that have a
discriminatory effect, she may rely on strict liability theory rather than having to prove
intentional discrimination)).
225. Id. at 920 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. 424).
226. See id. at 921 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
227. See id.
228. See id. at 922.
229. See id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
230. See id. at 922–23 (citing McDonnell Douglass, 411 U.S. at 802).
231. See id. at 931.
232. See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1015 (2d Cir. 1980).
233. See Negligent Discrimination, supra note 28, at 932.
234. Id.
235. Id. (citing Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (safe
workplace); Najera v. S. Pac. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (unfit coemployees and supervisors)).
236. Id. at 932–33 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314B (1965)).
237. See id. at 933.
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Oppenheimer also compares this duty to the duty to accommodate
differences, found in Teamsters, where the Court discussed the liability
of failing to act. 238 Though the duty of care has largely been used in the
context of religious accommodations, any employer who failed to
prevent discrimination from occurring could ostensibly be held
liable. 239 In fact, after years of unsuccessful sexual harassment claims,
the EEOC began applying the liability for failure to act — for example,
in the case of workplace sexual harassment, an employer may be
responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to “sexual
harassment . . . in the workplace, where the employer . . . knows or
should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action.” 240 Through an evolving landscape of the
law, Oppenheimer demonstrates that negligent discrimination is
potentially closer to practice than we think.
Oppenheimer’s ideas opened the door for other legal scholars to
explore the application of tort law to employment discrimination, as
well as the possibility of a duty for employers to prevent discrimination.
One example of such exploration is a 2009 article by Professor Noah
D. Zatz, which confronted the idea that employers have a duty to do
more than simply respond when employees are harassed or
discriminated against by outsiders. 241 To begin, Zatz explains the case
of Dunn v. Washington County Hospital, in which an employee sued
her employer for sex discrimination after she made a complaint to the
hospital that an independent contractor at the hospital — therefore, a
third party — was sexually harassing her and the hospital did not act. 242
Here, the Seventh Circuit stated that “[t]he employer’s responsibility is
to provide its employees with nondiscriminatory working conditions.
The genesis of inequality matters not; what does matter is how the
employer handles the problem.” 243 This notion seems to expand far
beyond that of an employer’s duty to maintain a non-discriminatory
environment, extending even to actors outside of the employer’s direct
control. 244
Interestingly, Zatz’s theory also rejects some long-held beliefs
about Title VII — notably that there has to be either disparate treatment
or disparate impact in order to prove discrimination, an idea which
Oppenheimer had also rejected in his analysis of Griggs and

238. See id. at 936.
239. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d, 402 U.S.
689 (1971) (per curiam) (testing the duty to accommodate religious beliefs).
240. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2020); see also Negligent Discrimination, supra note 28, at
956.
241. Managing the Macaw, supra note 29, at 1359.
242. Id. at 1359 (citing Dunn v. Wash. Cnty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2005)).
243. Id. (quoting Dunn, 429 F.3d at 691).
244. See id. at 1360.
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McDonnell Douglas. 245 In fact, by analyzing the treatment of third
parties in discrimination cases, Zatz suggests that there is, and should
be, an entirely separate doctrine for cases of non-accommodation,
where the employer refuses to reasonably accommodate employee’s
complaints of discrimination. 246 To make this point, Zatz argues that
by providing reasonable accommodations and refraining from disparate
treatment, employers can prevent “membership causation,” a phrase
used to describe when an employee suffers workplace harm due to her
membership in a protected class, regardless of where that harm comes
from. 247 Then, because the employer is capable of preventing
membership causation, Zatz explains that the employer should be liable
for workplace harm when it does occur. 248 Though Zatz focuses
primarily on the application of this doctrine to third parties, his message
is clear — employers have a duty to prevent discrimination in the
workplace, and should be held liable when they fail to do so.
In addition to Professors Oppenheimer and Zatz, Professor Charles
Sullivan similarly finds a corollary between tort law and employment
law regarding the question of imposed duties for employers. In his 2012
article, Sullivan focuses primarily on the idea of discrimination as an
intentional tort. 249 The article primarily details one case, Staub v.
Proctor Hospital, in which the Supreme Court further wrote tort law
into antidiscrimination statutes by explicitly adopting tort law’s
definition of intent for statutory discrimination cases. 250 However,
instead of easing the notion of discriminatory intent like many
perceived Staub to do, Sullivan argues that Staub actually adds another
layer to the plaintiff’s burden. 251
The plaintiff in Staub was fired by his employer because of his
service in the military, 252 which was unlawful under the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. 253 Sullivan notes
that Staub will govern cases under more traditional antidiscrimination
statutes, including Title VII, as they provide similar language for
antidiscrimination claims. 254 Both statutes place the burden of
persuasion on the plaintiff, and will not allow damages if the employer
245. See Negligent Discrimination, supra note 28, at 919.
246. See Managing the Macaw, supra note 29, at 1362.
247. See id.
248. See id. at 1364.
249. Charles Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431
(2012) [hereinafter Tortifying Employment Discrimination].
250. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2009).
251. Tortifying Employment Discrimination, supra note 249, at 1431–32.
252. See Staub, 562 U.S. at 411.
253. See Tortifying Employment Discrimination, supra note 249, at 1435 (citing Pub. L.
No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3153 (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–35)).
254. See id. at 1435–36 (citing Staub, 562 U.S. at 417) (clarifying that both statues “declare
it is unlawful for the specified grounds to be a ‘motivating factor’ for the challenged
employment action,” among other similar language).
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meets its burden of showing that it would have made the same decision
regardless of the protected characteristic. 255
Analyzing the employment discrimination claim, Justice Scalia
held that if a supervisor performed an act motivated by discriminatory
animus that was “intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse
employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate
employment action, then the employer is liable.” 256 As Sullivan notes,
this is the first time the language of tortious intent had been brought
directly into the employment law context. 257 Sullivan argues that this
case left open many questions as to what the employer’s actual duties
are. 258 For example, where Zatz had argued for liability arising from
third parties, Sullivan notes that under this intent-based analysis, it is
unclear whether an employer could even be liable for the actions of
subordinates. 259 Sullivan’s analysis raises the question of how far tort
law can truly be integrated into employment discrimination law, at least
without also requiring a duty to prevent discrimination.
Professor Richard Thompson Ford similarly mulled over the
question of intent as part of employment discrimination. Ford argues
precisely for how to fill the gap that Oppenheimer had described —
“abandon[ing] conceptual disputes over ‘discrimination’ in favor of
[discussing] the employer’s affirmative duty to avoid decisions and
policies that [harm] underrepresented or stigmatized groups.” 260 Ford
begins his argument with the notion of civil rights as the idea that we
should protect individuals from potentially oppressive states. 261 Over
time, he explains, the law has gradually grown to protect individuals
not just from oppressive states but also oppressive private
institutions. 262 By assigning rights to overcome these private actors, he
argues that having legal rights does not mean that an individual is
specially protected against power. 263 Instead, these rights are a political
decision to assign power from one group to another. 264 This is the
notion that drove change throughout the civil rights era of the American
1960s. 265
Today, one of these rights is the right not to be discriminated
against in employment based on certain prohibited reasons, including
255. See id. at 1436.
256. Id. at 1439–40 (quoting Staub, 562 U.S. at 422).
257. See id. at 1433.
258. See id. at 1448.
259. See id.
260. Rethinking Rights, supra note 25, at 2942.
261. See id. at 2946.
262. See id. (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946) (applying constitutional
standards to private entities that serve a “public function”); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (extending constitutional rights to private action)).
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 2949.
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race, sex, religion, etc. 266 Yet, while the law states that employers must
not discriminate on certain enumerated bases, Ford observes that the
law also creates a duty of care, though this duty has been largely
undefined. 267 Lacking a definition, the bounds of an employer’s duty
of care have been debated. Traditionally, the idea has been that
employers would only be liable for discrimination that they can prevent
as institutions but could not be liable for the discrimination they — the
entities themselves — did not cause. 268 This means that employers are
simply encouraged to avoid decisions that undermine social equality
but are not actually encouraged to promote social equality. 269
However, even when employers have reasonable anti-harassment
or antidiscrimination policies, employees still may face harassment or
discrimination. 270 That injustice is no different for the individual
simply because the employer has an antidiscrimination policy. 271 As
such, Ford argues that the law should address the outcomes openly by
defining the employer’s duty of care. 272 For example, he suggests a
policy change that would reward employers who hire members of
underrepresented groups, instead of making it more “risky” to hire such
people for desire to protect the company from liability. 273 Similarly, a
manager who discriminates in the workplace, where the employer has
a reasonable antidiscrimination policy, has acted outside the scope of
his authority and should be liable for that action independently. 274 In
effect, Ford argues for a complete overhaul of the system of
antidiscrimination law in favor of policy that hits at the source of the
outcomes that employment law actively tries to prevent.
Following in the footsteps of these legal scholars, I argue that in
the age of automated decision-making that we now live in, an auditing
imperative assigned to the use of automated hiring system is one way
to delineate the employer’s affirmative duty of care. This auditing
imperative demands certain actions on the part of the employers as well
as the designers of automated hiring systems. Below, I detail a hybrid
approach to the redress of employment discrimination that, although
not doing away entirely with the intent requirement, focuses on
alternative means to prevent employment discrimination, by requiring
external and internal audits, mandating design elements that allow for
record keeping and data retention as the standard mode for automated

266. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17.
267. See Rethinking Rights, supra note 25, at 2950–51.
268. See id. at 2956.
269. See Bias in the Air, supra note 25, at 1388.
270. See Rethinking Rights, supra note 25, at 2957.
271. See id. at 2957–58.
272. See id. at 2959.
273. See id. at 2960.
274. See Bias in the Air, supra note 25, at 1417.
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hiring, and allowing for collective bargaining by workers to set the
terms of use of automated hiring in the workplace.

V. A HYBRID APPROACH
As described above, the problems with automated hiring go beyond
the scope of issues that could typically be addressed through litigation.
Thus, any attempts to remedy those problems must necessarily adopt a
hybrid approach. I set forth two proposed hybrid measures:
(1) mandated audits (both external and internal, which will enable
litigation), and (2) collective bargaining, which could serve three ends:
encouraging fairness by design for automated hiring systems by
pushing for embedded data-retention mechanisms; including probative
criteria in hiring to ensure that criteria is not merely a stand-in for class
membership; and negotiating for data control and checks on data
portability to prevent the algorithmic blackballing of employees. I also
address some potential objections to these proposed measures. 275
The auditing of automated decision-making systems is an idea that
is gaining ground. 276 This is especially true with regard to employment
decision-making, as several experts working in the field support the
275. Note that one scholar advocates for exceptions to copyright law that would allow for
scrutiny of decision-making algorithms by third parties without violating the CFAA and also
allow for otherwise copyrighted material to be used as part of the training data for algorithmic
systems. My approach focuses on the idea of a certified third-party auditor that would
alleviate the concerns regarding proprietary information, and does not necessarily require a
change in existing framework — a fraught and contentious process.
276. See Auditing Algorithms, supra note 21, at 191 (proposing the retention of audits of
automated decision-making to check for discrimination); Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory
State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369, 372–73 (2016)
(“[P]olicymakers must devise ways of enabling regulators to evaluate algorithmicallyembedded controls . . .”); Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to
Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 16–17 (2017) (discussing designing
algorithmic systems to enable audits by regulators); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 126, at
24–25 (proposing that the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) audit consumer scoring
systems); Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 169–71 (2010) (calling for
monitoring of search engines and considering the possibility of the FTC playing that role);
W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 464–65
(2017) (calling for greater FDA and third-party scrutiny of medical algorithms); Paul
Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the American
Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1325 (1992) (calling for
“independent governmental monitoring of data processing systems”); Rory Van Loo, Helping
Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1312–16
(2015) (proposing that the FTC monitor Amazon); Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Sean K.
Hallisey, Equality and Privacy by Design: A New Model of Artificial Intelligence Data
Transparency Via Auditing, Certification, and Safe Harbor Regimes, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
428, 429 (2019) (proposing “an auditing regime and a certification program, run either by a
governmental body or, in the absence of such entity, by private institutions”); see also Kate
Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 121–24 (2014) (considering auditing by public
agencies to address predictive privacy).
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idea of mandated audits for automated hiring systems. One quibble is
whether such audits should be internal or external. Meredith Whittaker,
co-founder of the AI Now Institute at New York University and founder
of Google’s Open Research group, notes that “AI is not impartial or
neutral” and suggests that “in the case of systems meant to automate
candidate search and hiring, we need to ask ourselves: What
assumptions about worth, ability and potential do these systems reflect
and reproduce? Who was at the table when these assumptions were
encoded?” 277 She also observes that because “systems like HireVue are
proprietary and not open to review,” there is no way to “validate their
claims of fairness and ensure they aren’t simply tech-washing and
amplifying longstanding patterns of discrimination[.]” 278 Thus, she
insists on the need for audits by experts, advocacy groups, and
academia. 279
In response to this concern, Loren Larsen, Chief Technology
Officer of HireVue, admits that it is very important to audit the
algorithms used in hiring to identify and correct for any bias but argues
that “[n]o company doing this kind of work should depend only on a
third-party firm to ensure that they are doing this work in a responsible
way . . . . [I]t is the responsibility of the company itself to audit the
algorithms as an ongoing, day-to-day process.” 280
Given the example of regulation in other jurisdictions, where for
example the GDPR denotes algorithm audits as essential for the public
good, particularly for protecting those who are already marginalized
citizens, 281 or the example of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which mandates
auditor independence and also requires that internal officers certify
financial reports quarterly, 282 I propose that corporations employing
automated hiring systems should be mandated to engage in both
internal and external audits of such systems, and I lay out the case for
each type of audit in the following sections and also discuss the
potential downfalls for each system.

277. Eric Rosenbaum, Silicon Valley Is Stumped: Even A.I. Cannot Always Remove Bias
from Hiring, CNBC (May 30, 2018, 5:54 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/30/siliconvalley-is-stumped-even-a-i-cannot-remove-bias-from-hiring.html [https://perma.cc/L3TYTAK9].
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. Id.
281. See id. (“In recruiting — a space in which sensitive and life-changing decisions are
made all the time in which we accordingly have established strong civil rights protections . . .
algorithmic bias [is] especially important to detect and act against.”).
282. See generally The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
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A. Internal Auditing as Corporate Social Responsibility
A federal regime of mandated internal auditing will ensure that
companies diligently review the outcomes of automated hiring and
correct for any discovered bias. On August 19, 2019, a group of 181
business executives collaboratively working together as the Business
Roundtable released a statement in which they recognized a
responsibility beyond merely satisfying shareholders. 283 Rather, the
group, which included executives from Walmart, Apple, Pepsi, and
others, acknowledged that they must also “invest in their employees,
protect the environment and deal fairly and ethically with their
suppliers.” 284 Given this acknowledgement, I argue that internal audits
to check automated hiring systems for bias are a key part of the
corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) of business firms as this
ensures that corporations are taking seriously their responsibility not to
unlawfully discriminate against applicants.
Thus, I propose that large corporations and other entities should be
required to implement a business system of regular self-audits of their
hiring outcomes to check for disparate impact. Such mandated selfaudits would be similar to the mandated self-audits of financial
institutions. In an internal audit activity, 285 or self-auditing, a
“department, division, team of consultants, or other practitioner(s)
[provide] independent, objective assurance and consulting services
designed to add value and improve an organization’s operations.” 286 By
evaluating and improving the effectiveness of “governance, risk
management and control processes” in a systematic and disciplined
way, internal auditing helps an organization reach its objectives. 287
I note here that legislation similar to the audit regime I am
proposing has been introduced by several members of the New York
City Council. The proposed legislation, filed on February 27, 2020,
283. The statement begins: “Americans deserve an economy that allows each person to
succeed through hard work and creativity and to lead a life of meaning and dignity. We believe
the free-market system is the best means of generating good jobs, a strong and sustainable
economy, innovation, a healthy environment and economic opportunity for all.” Statement on
the Purpose of a Corporation, Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation
to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-acorporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans
[https://perma.cc/Q5PDRYAY].
284. David Gelles & David Yaffe Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Everything,
Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/
business/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html [https://perma.cc/4ZWW-5XEE].
285. By internal self-audit, I am referring here to audits that should be conducted by the
hiring company, the putative employer.
286. THE INST. OF INTERNAL AUDITORS, INT’L STANDARDS FOR THE PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE OF INTERNAL AUDITING 23 (2016), https://na.theiia.org/standardsguidance/public%20documents/ippf-standards-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AP5-6CMW].
287. Id.
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would make it unlawful to sell or offer for sale in New York City an
automated employment decision tool that does not comply with the
stated provisions, including a requirement that the tool “shall be the
subject of a bias audit conducted in the past year prior to selling or
offering for sale such tool.” 288 “Bias audit” is defined as “an impartial
evaluation, including but not limited to testing, of an automated
employment decision tool to assess its predicted compliance with the
provisions of section 8-107 and any other applicable law relating to
discrimination in employment.” 289 Section 8-107 prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of “the actual or perceived age,
race, creed, color, national origin, gender, disability, marital status,
partnership status, caregiver status, sexual and reproductive health
decisions, sexual orientation, uniformed service or immigration or
citizenship status.” 290 However, this is not a federal bill, it does not
attach to federal employment antidiscrimination law, and even if
passed, it would apply only in New York City.
During the writing of this Article, Senators Cory Booker and Ron
Wyden also proposed the Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, 291
with Representative Yvette Clarke sponsoring an equivalent bill in the
House, which comports with the auditing proposals I make here, but
which I argue are missing key elements that would allow such audits to
be useful. Notably, the proposed bill makes no mention of recordkeeping or data retention mandates for automated hiring. An audit that
does not include all relevant data will be ineffectual. Furthermore, this
proposed bill is lacking a collaborative aspect. My proposal for an “Fair
Automated Hiring Mark,” which I explain in more detail below,
encourages employers to be actively invested in ensuring that their
automated hiring systems are not biased. In the Subsections below, I
detail my proposal for electronic “tear-off sheets” that could both
protect and embargo the demographic data of job applicants, and I
discuss applicant selection and what guidelines should determine the
variables deployed by automated hiring systems.
1. Tear-off Sheets: What Information is Needed for Verification?
Professors David Lehr and Paul Ohm note several issues with
machine learning algorithms. 292 Notably, they observe that many
288. Sale of Automated Employment Decision Tools, N.Y. City Counsel Int. No. 1894
(N.Y.C.
2020),
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4344524&
GUID=B051915D-A9AC-451E-81F8-6596032FA3F9&Options=ID
[https://perma.cc/RJ9H-GQJK].
289. Id.
290. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (2021).
291. Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, S.1108, 116th Cong. (2019).
292. See David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 670 (2017).
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machine learning algorithms suffer from the problem of “over-fitting,”
which happens when “a statistical method . . . identif[ies] as legitimate
correlations due to randomness, including outliers, in the training
data — randomness that will not be the same in the real-world data to
which the algorithm is eventually applied.” 293 This presents a problem
for making real-world predictions because “if certain variables take on
non-randomly extremely high or low values in the training and test data,
but not in real-world data, the rules an algorithm learns to make
predictions in the former may fail on the latter.” 294 Thus, an essential
part of the internal audit check is verifying the accuracy of predictions
made by the automated hiring system.
Another issue that an internal audit should check for is inherited
bias in the automated hiring system that could have a disparate impact
on protected categories of applicants. To ask for an employer to audit
whether a hiring system has had an adverse impact on applicants who
are members of a protected class represents a paradox, as employers are
typically not allowed to collect that information at the hiring stage.
Professor Ignacio Cofone notes this paradox and argues that the true
solution is not just to regulate the “use” of the data, but to regulate the
“acquisition” of such information. 295
From an auditing standpoint, however, neither the use nor the
acquisition of the information is as much a problem as the lack of such
data. Thus, my proposal is a redesign of automated hiring system to
have a “tear-off sheet” like traditional paper hiring used to have. 296 This
was an additional sheet that could be torn away from all paper
applications before those applications were passed to the decisionmaker. In the case of an automated hiring system, it is a simple method
of writing code wherein demographic information (such as age, race,
gender) is solicited from the job applicant but such protected
information is segregated from the rest of the electronic application,
and is embargoed, meaning decision-makers cannot access that
information, until after a hiring decision has been made. Currently,
many applications do solicit these types of demographic information,
but only on a voluntary basis. This means that many applicants may
choose not to share the information. Thus, my proposal is that provision
of demographic information would be mandatory for automated hiring,

293. Id. at 684.
294. Id. (emphasis omitted).
295. Ignacio N. Cofone, Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70
HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1392 (2019) (emphasis omitted).
296. The EEOC noted in an informal discussion letter that “tear-off sheets” are lawful
under Title VII because of a legitimate need for the information for affirmative action
purposes or to track applicant flow. The EEOC Informal Discussion Letter, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Aug. 5, 2002), https://www.eeoc.gov/foia/eeoc-informaldiscussion-letter-78 [https://perma.cc/58M2-BUND].
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and that a notice regarding the initial sequestration of said demographic
information should be provided to applicants.
2. Enhancing Applicant Selection: What Standards Should Apply?
Standards and best practices already exist for conducting an
effective internal audit. 297 As an international professional association,
the Institute of Internal Auditors (“IIA”) gives guidance on internal
auditing. 298 For an internal audit to be considered effective, it should
achieve ten core principles, which include “[d]emonstrat[ing]
competence and due professional care” and “[being] insightful,
proactive, and future-focused.” 299 Also, as listed in the Institute’s Code
of Ethics, internal auditors are expected to uphold the following
principles: integrity, objectivity, confidentiality, and competency. 300
The quality of the internal audit activity should also be assured through
internal and external assessments, which are public reviews and dayto-day measurement, supervision, and review of the activities and
assessment by an independent reviewer from outside of the
organization, respectively. 301
Internal audits are already commonplace in some industries. One
genre of organizations that follow the IIA standards comprises bank
and financial service companies. 302 I have previously compared the
fiduciary duties of banks to the fiduciary duties of platforms who serve
as information fiduciaries to the job applicants, who entrust such
platforms with their personal data. 303 In banks, internal audits are
required not only in terms of financial reporting, but also regarding
legal compliance and general effectiveness. 304 Relevant institutions
have constantly emphasized the independence of these audits. The 2001
guidelines of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the
principal agency establishing international banking standards, states
297. See, e.g., id. at 1–3.
298. See Core Principles for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, INST.
INTERNAL AUDITORS, https://na.theiia.org/standards-guidance/mandatory-guidance/Pages/
Core-Principles-for-the-Professional-Practice-of-Internal-Auditing.aspx
[https://perma.cc/7GT6-AHGY].
299. Id.
300. See
Code
of
Ethics, INST. INTERNAL AUDITORS
(Jan.
2009),
https://na.theiia.org/standards-guidance/Public%20Documents/IPPF_Code_of_Ethics_0109.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6YK-JYE2].
301. THE INST. OF INTERNAL AUDITORS, supra note 286; Matthew Bender, BANKS &
THRIFTS: GOV’T ENFORCEMENT & RECEIVERSHIP § 5.04, 5–39 (2018).
302. Federal banking regulators suggest that the internal audit function be conducted
according to professional standards. See Michael E. Murphy, Assuring Responsible Risk
Management in Banking: The Corporate Governance Dimension, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 121,
136–37 (2011).
303. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Testing Meets Big Data: Torts and Contract Law Issues,
75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1225 (2014).
304. See Murphy, supra note 302, at 136.
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that “[a] bank’s internal audit function must be . . . independent from
the everyday internal control process.” 305 Further, the guidance issued
by a subcommittee of the Federal Reserve System emphasizes that such
internal audit must “[be] independent from the day-to-day functioning
of the bank and [have] access to all activities conducted by the banking
organization.” 306 In support of this, the manuals of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Officer of the Comptroller of the Currency, and
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council advocate that
internal auditors report “solely and directly” to the audit committee. 307
Given the risk of management interference, an audit committee should
consist of outside directors, without reporting to their supervisors. 308
Self-auditing is also conducted and recommended in other types of
industries, such as manufacturing sectors, because it helps the
businesses meet the requirements of relevant laws. For instance, an
occupational safety and health self-audit is an “assessment of
workplace hazards, controls, programs, and documents performed by a
business owner or employee” in compliance with the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) regulations. 309
Occupational safety and health self-audits are already standard in the
manufacturing sector, and there are suggestions to improve inter-rater
reliability and accuracy in the process. 310 Furthermore, OSHA allows
hiring a consultant within the company to perform self-audits when
OSHA is not able to do an inspection immediately. 311
3. The Benefits of Internal Audits
Others have noted that self-audits can enhance CSR. 312 The four
levels of CSR self-audit allow companies to examine their performance
in relation to ad hoc policy, standard policy, planned policy, and
evaluated and reviewed policy. 313 Furthermore, self-audits allow for
305. Id. at 137 (citing BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNAL AUDIT IN
BANKS AND THE SUPERVISOR’S RELATIONSHIP WITH AUDITORS 3 (2001)).
306. Id. at 138 (citing BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, FRAMEWORK FOR
INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS IN BANKING ORGANISATIONS 20–21 (1998)).
307. See id. at 139; GARY M. DEUTSCH, RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
§ 27A.03[11][c], 27A-47 (2017).
308. See Murphy, supra note 302, at 139.
309. Samuel C. Yamin, David L. Parker, Min Xi & Rodney Stanley, Self-Audit of
Lockout/Tagout in Manufacturing Workplaces: A Pilot Study, 60 AM. J. IND. MED. 504, 504
(2017).
310. Id. at 504–06.
311. See Martin v. Bally’s Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1252 (1993); Olivia
K. LaBoda, Dueling Approaches to Dual Purpose Documents: The Reaches of the Work
Product Doctrine After Textron, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 727, 737 (2011).
312. See Peter Kok, Ton van der Wiele, Richard McKenna & Alan Brown, A Corporate
Social Responsibility Audit within a Quality Management Framework, 31 J. BUS. ETHICS 285,
291–93 (2001).
313. See id.
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strategic and operational business planning through identification of
strengths and prevention of problems. 314 This genre of CSR self-audit
process requires “proper training of self-auditors, allocation of
sufficient time to perform the audit, preparation of audit aids,
management support, and an adequate follow-up to audit findings.” 315
Safe harbor from antidiscrimination laws, which other scholars
have considered, 316 can be another incentive for internal auditing. Yet,
there is a question of whether internal audits alone (or even in
conjunction with external audits) are adequate for ensuring safe harbor
from antidiscrimination laws which other scholars have addressed. I,
however, maintain that internal audits can confer other benefits besides
safe harbor. I argue that rather than merely serving as a protectionist
tool against employment discrimination lawsuits, internal audits would
benefit corporations interested in diversifying their personnel. Business
scholars have shown that a workplace with diverse employees is ideal
for achieving sought-after business goals such as greater innovation. 317
Thus, the internal audits could provide corporations with a tool to
discover their blind spots in regard to preconceived notions of
qualification and fit and might even help bring other problems of bias
in hiring to the attention of the corporation. For example, the audits
could shatter misconceptions as to qualifications by surfacing rejected
candidates who nonetheless went on to become stellar employees at
other companies. Or, the audits could reveal a rather shallow pool of
diverse qualified applicants, indicating either a negative brand image
for the company, work climate problems, or the need to establish a
sturdier pipeline to the industry for diverse candidates.
B. External Auditing: The Fair Automated Hiring Mark
Given the proprietary nature of hiring algorithms, one approach
that balances intellectual property protection concerns with the need for
greater accountability is a certification system that operates on external
third-party audits by an independent certifying entity. I take as
inspiration for this proposed certification system Professors Ian Ayres
and Jennifer Brown’s framework for corporations to certify

314. See Self-Audit for Quality Improvement, 18 STRATEGIC DIRECTION 5, 18 (2002).
315. Id.
316. See, e.g., Pauline Kim, Safe Harbors for Algorithms? (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
317. See Katherine W. Phillips, Commentary to EARL LEWIS, NANCY CANTOR,
KATHERINE PHILLIPS & SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIVERSITY BONUS: HOW GREAT TEAMS PAY
OFF IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 223, 238 (2019) (showing that diverse groups outperform
homogenous groups because of both an influx of new ideas and more careful information
processing); see also Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles, 111
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18524 (2014).
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discrimination-free workplaces that comply with the Employment NonDiscrimination Act (“ENDA”). 318 The authors propose:
[B]y entering into the licensing agreement with us, an
employer gains the right (but not the obligation) to use
the mark and in return promises to abide by the wordfor-word strictures of ENDA. Displaying the mark
signals to knowing consumers and employees that the
company manufacturing the product or providing the
service has committed itself not to discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation. 319
Other legal scholars have also proposed certification systems for
algorithms. Notably, Andrew Tutt has proposed an “FDA for
algorithms,” in which the federal government would establish an
agency to oversee different classes of algorithms to ensure that, much
like food and medicine marketed for human consumption, those
algorithms would pose no harm to those over whom they exercise
decision-making power. 320 And Professor Rory Van Loo makes a
compelling case for regulatory monitoring of platforms that employ
automated decision-making. 321 He defines regulatory monitoring as
“the collection of information that the [government] agency can force
a business to provide even without suspecting a particular act of
wrongdoing.” 322 Van Loo notes that key factors indicating a need for
regulatory monitoring include a public interest in preventing harm,
information asymmetries, and a lack of faith in self-regulation. 323
Given that these factors are undeniably present for automated
hiring, I argue for either a government agency or a third-party nongovernmental agency as auditing and certifying authority. The
governmental agency could be under the aegis of the EEOC. Thus, the
EEOC would audit and certify automated hiring platforms before those
platforms could lawfully be deployed in the hiring process. However,
given the financial and time burden such a certifying process could
exact on governmental resources, a non-governmental entity, much like
the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (“LEED”)
318. ENDA is legislation proposed in the United States Congress that would prohibit
discrimination in hiring and employment on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity
by employers with at least 15 employees. See generally Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown,
Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination: Privatizing ENDA with a Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1639 (2006).
319. Id. at 1641.
320. See Tutt, supra note 4, at 83.
321. Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of
Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (2019).
322. Id. at 1574.
323. Id. at 1573.
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certification system, is a good alternative. LEED was established in
1993 “with a mission to promote sustainability-focused practices in the
building industry.” 324 Thus, LEED serves as a “green certification
program for building design, construction, operations, and
maintenance.” 325 The LEED certification involves a formal
certification letter, as well as plaques, signage for buildings, and an
electronic badge that may be displayed on a website. 326
This third-party certification would not comprise of a one-time
audit, but rather involve periodic audits of the hiring algorithms to
check for disparate impact on vulnerable populations. Thus, this
ongoing process would ensure that the audited corporations and
organizations continue to hew to fair automated hiring practices. In
return, the corporation or organization would earn the right to use a Fair
Automated Hiring Mark (“FAHM”; see illustration of a potential mark
below) for its online presence, for communication materials, and for
display on hiring advertisements to attract a more diverse pool of
applicants.

FAHM

Figure 1: The Proposed Fair Automated Hiring Mark
I envision that such a third-party certification entity would be
composed of multi-disciplinary teams of auditors comprising both
lawyers and either software engineers or data scientists who would
audit the hiring algorithms employed by corporations and
organizations. This strategy would prevent some of the tunnel-vision
problems associated with technology created without consideration for
legal frameworks and broader societal goals. Furthermore, such a
certification system could serve as a feedback mechanism and thus
enable better design and best practices for automated hiring systems.

324. Impact
Conference,
U.S.
GREEN
BUILDING
COUNCIL,
https://impact.usgbc.org/#about [https://perma.cc/VSM4-JNF3].
325. Global Dow Center Earns LEED Silver Certification, FACILITY EXECUTIVE,
https://facilityexecutive.com/2020/01/global-dow-center-earns-leed-silver-certification
[https://perma.cc/B7PQ-PKCT].
326. See Congrats! You’ve Earned LEED Certification., U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL,
https://new.usgbc.org/post-certification [https://perma.cc/2RE3-HWUA].
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1. The Pros and Cons of a Governmental Certifying System
A governmental certification that is federally mandated would
provide uniformity in the practice of automated hiring and would also
ensure compliance in regard to auditing. 327 However, the issues of
regulatory capture 328 and political wind shifts weigh against the
adoption of a governmental certifying system. As history has shown,
governmental agencies are vulnerable to regulatory capture,329
meaning that private influence on the workings of such agencies, as
well as political wind shifts, can render such agencies toothless or
ineffectual. While there are varying definitions of regulatory capture,
“[w]hat is true, however, is that because the top officials of federal
regulatory agencies are presidential appointees, interest groups,
whether they are industries, unions, or consumer or environmental
groups, influence the regulatory agencies, and one can think of this
influence as a kind of capture.” 330
Examples of regulatory capture abound in American government,
including that of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”), 331 the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), 332 and most
327. Some legal scholars have previously argued for governmental oversight based on a
taxonomy of the distinct operations of algorithmic systems in a wide range of spheres. See
Desai & Kroll, supra note 276, at 42–55. My proposed interventions in this Article focus
solely on the employment sphere.
328. Daniel Carpenter and David Moss define “regulatory capture” as “the result or process
by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from
the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action
of the industry itself.” DANIEL CARPENTER & DAVID A. MOSS, PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 13 (2014).
329. See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from
Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679 (2012) (highlighting the inherent
connection between the public and private enforcement of securities laws); see also David
Freeman Engstrom, Corralling Capture, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 35–37 (2013)
(detailing the presumed problem of regulatory capture).
330. CARPENTER & MOSS, supra note 328, at 54 (2014). Most recently, an in-depth
investigative report by The New Yorker revealed the staggering extent of the regulatory
capture of the FDA by Purdue Pharma, a privately held company established by the Sackler
family and which developed the prescription painkiller OxyContin. The painkiller, which is
almost twice as powerful as morphine, has been at the forefront of the current American
opioid crisis, as it was extensively marketed for long-term pain relief despite medical evidence
of its addictive properties. The FDA, without corroborating evidence from clinical trials,
approved a package insert for OxyContin that stated the drug was safer than competing
painkillers — the FDA examiner who approved the package insert, Dr. Curtis Wright, was
hired at Purdue Pharma soon after he left the FDA. See Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family
That
Built
an
Empire
of
Pain,
NEW YORKER
(Oct.
23,
2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-an-empire-of-pain
[https://perma.cc/5W8K-UPK2].
331. Other scholars have detailed a revolving door of SEC employees to and from the
financial sector and how it has contributed to regulatory capture of the SEC. See, e.g., Stewart
L. Brown, Mutual Funds and the Regulatory Capture of the SEC, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 701,
707 (2017).
332. See Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family That Built an Empire of Pain, NEW YORKER
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-an-
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importantly the EEOC. 333 In the employment context specifically, the
EEOC, which is charged with employment regulation, has been
susceptible to administration change. Consider, for example, that in
2014 President Obama issued a presidential memorandum on pay data
transparency 334 instructing the Secretary of Labor to propose a
regulation mandating that federal contractors must disclose pay data
broken down by race and gender to the EEOC. 335 This presidential
memorandum meant to combat gender gaps in pay. 336 However, in
2017, the Acting Chair of the EEOC, appointed by President Trump,
issued a press release announcing an immediate stay of the EEOC
regulation. 337
2. The Pros and Cons of a Third-Party Non-Governmental Certifying
System
A commercial third-party certifying entity with a business
reputation to protect would be much less susceptible to regulatory
capture. For one, given the voluntary nature of the relationship between
the certifying entity and the employer using automated hiring systems,
there is much less of an impetus for regulatory capture in the first place.
Thus, the FAHM mark, rather than representing a mere rubber stamp,
will come to serve as a reputable market signal for employers who are
truly interested in creating a more diverse workplace. Notably, a nongovernmental entity would better withstand the vagaries of political
wind shifts like those that influenced the Federal Communications
Commission 338 and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) regarding
empire-of-pain [https://perma.cc/5W8K-UPK2] (discussing how a family-owned business
co-opted the FDA drug certification system through fraud and corruption).
333. Consider that the Trump administration attempted to suspend a pay data collection
rule that had been promulgated by the Obama administration to combat the gender pay gap
through encouraging transparency in pay. See Alexia Fernández Campbell, Trump Tried to
Sabotage a Plan to Close the Gender Pay Gap. A Judge Wouldn’t Have It., VOX (Apr. 26,
2019, 10:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/4/26/18515920/gender-pay-gap-rule-eeoc
[https://perma.cc/6PSR-JTGV].
334. See Memorandum on Advancing Pay Equality Through Compensation Data
Collection, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 251 (Apr. 8, 2014); see also Press Release, The
White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: New Steps to Advance Equal Pay on the
Seventh Anniversary of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/29/fact-sheet-new-stepsadvance-equal-pay-seventh-anniversary-lilly [https://perma.cc/29TM-V87Y].
335. See Memorandum on Advancing Pay Equality, supra note 334.
336. See Press Release, The White House, supra note 334.
337. See Danielle Paquette, The Trump Administration Just Halted This Obama-Era Rule
to Shrink the Gender Wage Gap, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2017, 2:37 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/30/the-trump-administration-justhalted-this-obama-era-rule-to-shrink-the-gender-wage-gap/ [https://perma.cc/EMU9-YA73].
338. See Brian Fung, The House Just Voted to Wipe Away the FCC’s Landmark Internet
Privacy
Protections,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
28,
2017,
7:37
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/28/the-house-just-voted-towipe-out-the-fccs-landmark-internet-privacy-protections/ [https://perma.cc/LAV4-LLTE];
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net neutrality 339 or the Environmental Protection Agency regarding
climate change. 340
One argument, however, is that even independent third-party
certifying agencies are not immune to capture. As such entities will
derive an economic benefit from certifications, there is the danger that
such an agency could become a mere rubber-stamping entity without
adequate legal teeth to enforce any sanctions against the entities it is
certifying. However, said agency would operate on the trust of job
applicants as consumers, and the internet also affords greater
information dissemination. Thus, consumers in the form of job
applicants can now more forcefully make their voices heard regarding
algorithmic bias and could still blow the whistle 341 on any misconduct,
in turn undermining any certifying mark that does not hold true.
Another valid concern regarding external auditing agencies is the
privacy of applicant data. In particular, there is a need for regulation
regarding the end uses of applicant data derived from third-party audits
of automated hiring. For one, there should be regulations prohibiting
third-party vendors from selling data derived from applicant
information. In the absence of such regulation, companies undertaking
a third-party audit could enter into contractual agreements barring the
use of applicant data beyond the purposes of the audit, including the
sale or transfer of that data to other parties.
A recent audit by HireVue may yet provide the best argument
against third party auditing. In 2019, the nonprofit Electronic Privacy
Information Center lodged a complaint with the FTC alleging that
HireVue’s use of AI to assess job candidate’s video interviews

see also Jeff Dunn, Trump Just Killed Obama’s Internet-Privacy Rules — Here’s What That
INSIDER
(Apr.
4,
2017,
10:55
AM),
Means
for
You,
BUSINESS
http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-fcc-privacy-rules-repeal-explained-2017-4
[https://perma.cc/VE5S-WD5N].
339. See Michael Santorelli, After Net Neutrality: The FTC Is the Sheriff of Tech Again. Is
It Up to the Task?, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2017, 11:44 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/washingtonbytes/2017/12/15/the-game-is-on-the-ftc-tech-regulation-post-netneutrality/ [https://perma.cc/Q4MF-DZ3C] (discussing the FTC’s stance against net
neutrality).
340. See Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, How Scott Pruitt Turned the EPA into One of
Trump’s
Most
Powerful
Tools,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
31,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/under-scott-pruitt-a-year-oftumult-and-transformation-at-epa/2017/12/26/f93d1262-e017-11e7-8679a9728984779c_story.html [https://perma.cc/M7YM-UM5H]; see also Eric Lipton & Danielle
Ivory, Under Trump, EPA Has Slowed Actions Against Polluters, and Put Limits on
Enforcement Officers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/10/us/politics/pollution-epa-regulations.html [https://perma.cc/M4FD-SUUL].
341. See Katyal, supra note 4, at 107–08 (making a powerful argument for the importance
of whistleblowers in rectifying algorithmic bias). Other legal scholars have also made the
same argument while noting how trade secret laws might interfere with whistleblowing. See
Desai & Kroll, supra note 276, at 56–64 (2017).
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constituted “unfair and deceptive trade practices.” 342 While HireVue
denied any wrongdoing, in 2020, HireVue announced it would cease to
include a candidate’s facial expressions in video interviews as a factor
its algorithms considered. 343 On January 11, 2021, HireVue announced
that it had brought in the auditing entity, O’Neil Risk Consulting and
Algorithmic Auditing (“ORCAA”), to conduct an audit of its video
interviewing system. 344 The report of the audit, however, left many
questions unanswered. For one, ORCAA limited the audit to “pre-built
assessments used in hiring early career candidates, including from
college campuses.” 345 This audit does not assess what HireVue calls
“custom assessments,” special algorithms which companies may
commission that “are designed around job-related outcomes specified
by the client” with the potential purpose to “predict what a candidate’s
job performance would be, were that candidate hired.” 346
Limiting the scope of the audit to “pre-built” assessments means a
potentially damning majority of HireVue use cases may have been
excluded from the purview of the audit. 347 ORCAA acknowledges this
reality in the audit report, claiming “the use case we audited is not
necessarily common or representative of HireVue’s business overall”
but rather supposedly reflects what HireVue believes is a use case that
“would prompt hard fairness questions.” 348 Even though an audit of
custom assessments algorithms may be more difficult to conduct
because those algorithms vary in nature, many concerns raised about
HireVue center around bias replication by algorithms that rely on job

342. Complaint and Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief Submitted by
The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) at 1, HireVue Inc. (F.T.C. Nov. 6, 2019),
https://epic.org/privacy/ftc/hirevue/EPIC_FTC_HireVue_Complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G36P-2W9E].
343. Jeremy Kahn, HireVue Drops Facial Monitoring Amid A.I. Algorithm Audit,
FORTUNE (Jan. 19, 2021), https://fortune.com/2021/01/19/hirevue-drops-facial-monitoringamid-a-i-algorithm-audit/ [https://perma.cc/APC2-6B5S].
344. See Lindsey Zuloaga, Industry Leadership: New Audit Results and Decision on Visual
Analysis, HIREVUE (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.hirevue.com/blog/hiring/industryleadership-new-audit-results-and-decision-on-visual-analysis
[https://perma.cc/3LZEQHTB].
345. O’NEIL RISK CONSULTING AND ALGORITHMIC AUDITING, DESCRIPTION OF
ALGORITHMIC AUDIT: PRE-BUILT ASSESSMENTS 1 (2020), https://webapi.hirevue.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/01/oneil-risk-consulting-and-algorithmic-auditing-01-2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6LME-BVFV].
346. Id. at 2.
347. While HireVue does not share details on the type and frequency of their use cases,
evidence suggests that the company is commissioned to create custom assessments by some
major clients. See Unilever + HireVue, HIREVUE, https://www.hirevue.com/casestudies/global-talent-acquisition-unilever-case-study
[https://perma.cc/3N5M-5HCF]
(describing that HireVue claims its algorithms assessed “those candidates that are most likely
to be successful at Unilever,” implying that the Unilever algorithm was a custom assessment
designed to predict potential job performance at Unilever).
348. O’NEILL RISK CONSULTING AND ALGORITHMIC AUDITING, supra note 345, at 2.
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performance and hiring data from existing companies. 349 This audit did
not consider such concerns. Further, the applicability of the results of
this audit to decisions about the suitability of HireVue technology as a
whole heavily depends on the significance of the pre-built assessment
use case, data on which is currently unavailable to the general public.
If the pre-built assessment use case is a minor part of HireVue’s
business model, then this audit is practically insignificant. A more
meaningful audit would require examining multiple use-case scenarios
for fairness to understand the potential discriminatory effects of the
most common ways that HireVue’s product is deployed. The auditing
report should include demographic information about total applicants
screened under each use case and any disproportionate impact on
protected categories. Despite these inadequacies, the fact that HireVue
voluntarily undertook this independent third-party audit is welcome
development in the oversight of automated hiring systems. HireVue did
also identify further investigation as to potential bias arising from the
AI evaluation of different accents and also length of responses. 350 In
all, I argue that the HireVue audit, as the first of its kind, underscores
the need to create industry standards or guidelines for third-party
independent audits and, perhaps, for governmental mandated audits
conducted by a governmental agency with standardized procedures.
This last point especially rises from the skepticism of experts
regarding internal audits. Dipayan Ghosh, a Harvard fellow and former
Facebook privacy and public policy official, has no confidence in any
internal review process given past cases of self-certifying companies
revealed to be engaging in practices that were harmful to society and
certain populations. 351 According to Ghosh: “The public will have little
knowledge as to whether or not the firm really is making biased
decisions if it’s only the firm itself that has access to its decisionmaking algorithms to test them for discriminatory outcomes.” 352 Ghosh
notes that start-ups do not face enough pressure to use third-party audit
firms because it is “not required by law,” “costs money,” and would
“require ‘tremendous levels’ of compliance beyond what internal audits
likely require.” 353
349. See Rachel Winters, Should Robots Be Conducting Job Interviews?, SLATE (Oct. 5,
2020,
9:00
AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2020/10/artificial-intelligence-jobinterviews.html [https://perma.cc/V8CW-9NJA]; Andrew Jack, Will Recruitment
‘Gamification’ Drive Diversity or Replicate Biases?, FIN. TIMES (June 3, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/b24a7e9e-a1c1-11ea-b65d-489c67b0d85d
[https://perma.cc/4UPU-BFFA]; Sarah Fister Gale, Could Video Interviewing Land You in
Court?, WORKFORCE (July 1, 2019), https://www.workforce.com/news/video-interviewingland-you-in-court [https://perma.cc/ZV2X-MPFP].
350. O’NEILL RISK CONSULTING AND ALGORITHMIC AUDITING, supra note 345, at 4–5.
351. See Rosenbaum, supra note 277.
352. Id.
353. Id.
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C. Collective Bargaining
While internal and external audits could both enable litigation by
generating data to serve as statistical evidence of disparate impact or by
uncovering practices that could be considered discrimination per se,
collective bargaining as a collaborative exercise between employers
and worker unions could also set fair standards for automated hiring
and securing applicant data. In this section, I argue that collective
bargaining provides another avenue to check some of the deleterious
effects of automated hiring. Notably, collective bargaining could focus
on the role of data collection and usage. The target of such bargaining
would be trifold: (1) agreements as to what data will be digested by
automated hiring systems; that is, setting the standards for probative
applicant assessment criteria; (2) agreements as to the end uses of such
data; that is, contractual agreements as to what the data collected will
be used for, as well as data-retention agreements; and (3) agreements
as to the control and portability of the data created by automated hiring
systems.
While there has been much focus on the data input required for
automated decision-making, the data generated by this decisionmaking process is equally consequential, if not more so. This is because
automated hiring systems hold the potential to create indelible portraits
of applicants, which may be used to classify those individuals. 354 As a
result, data submitted by an applicant is deployed not just for one job
classification or even presented to just one employer. Rather, an
applicant-data-generated worker profile may live on past the snapshot
in time when the worker applied for a specific position and may come
to haunt them during an entirely different bid for employment. 355 In the
following sections, I detail the important role of collective bargaining
in achieving fair standards not only for the curation of input data, but
also for the portability of output data.
1. Data Digested and Determining Probative Evaluation Criteria
Arguments over standards of fairness and other approaches to
algorithmic accountability tend to neglect the role of data in
perpetuating discrimination. Yet, as several legal scholars have
observed, data is not neutral; rather, it is tainted by structural and
354. Professors Rick Bales and Katherine Stone have argued: “The data collected are
transformed by means of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms into a permanent electronic
resume that companies are using to track and assess current workers, and it could potentially
be shared among companies as workers move around the boundaryless workplace from job
to job.” Bales & Stone, supra note 60, at 3.
355. Id. at 3–4 (“This invisible electronic web threatens to invade worker privacy, deter
unionization, enable subtle forms of employer blackballing, exacerbate employment
discrimination, render unions ineffective, and obliterate the protections of the labor laws.”).
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institutional bias. 356 Collective bargaining regarding what data may be
used for assessment as part of algorithmic hiring systems is one
necessary approach to curbing employment discrimination. While the
content of hiring criteria is typically not a topic of collective
bargaining — collective bargaining tends to focus on the conditions of
employment for workers who have already been hired — I argue that
union leaders should not overlook the importance of securing fair data
collection and evaluation standards for their members. There is also the
argument that unions may tend to prioritize a focus on securing good
working conditions for current employees. Yet, with the decline in
union membership, securing good hiring conditions could be a boon for
unions.
The first task for unions to tackle is negotiating what data may be
digested by hiring algorithms. A crucial issue for this negotiation will
be determining what data is probative of “job fitness” or what data may
even be considered job-related. Professor Sullivan notes: “The
employer’s reliance on the algorithm may be job-related, but the
algorithm itself is measuring and tracking behavior that has no direct
relationship to job performance.” 357 And while some of the information
digested by hiring algorithms may be correlated with job success, as
other scholars have noted: “If a statistical correlation were sufficient to
satisfy the defense of job-relatedness, the standard would be a tautology
rather than a meaningful legal test.” 358
Rather than rely on flimsy and often irrelevant correlations
excavated by the algorithms, I concur with legal scholars who have
argued that the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures 359 should apply in negotiating what data will be digested by
automated hiring systems. 360 Although these Uniform Guidelines do
not amount to law, 361 they have been accorded deference in case law362
356. See Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the
Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA &
SOC’Y 973, 982 (2016); see also Chander, supra note 140, at 1039.
357. See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 421.
358. See Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, supra note 5, at 920.
359. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (2021).
360. See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 420–22; King & Mrkonich, supra note 96, at 574.
(supporting the use of the Guidelines in candidate selection generally)
361. See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 422.
362. The Court in Griggs concluded that the EEOC’s interpretation of the guidelines
should be given “great deference.” See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34
(1971). Later in Moody, the Court further observed that the “[g]uidelines draw upon and make
reference to professional standards of test validation established by the American
Psychological Association” and that while the guidelines were “not administrative
‘regulations’ promulgated pursuant to formal procedures established by the Congress . . . they
do constitute ‘[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency.’”
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430–31 (1975) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at
433–34). The Uniform Guidelines replaced the original EEOC guidelines in 1978 and it
enjoys broader consensus than the EEOC guidelines as it represents the collective view of the
EEOC and other federal agencies such as the Department of Labor, the Civil Service
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and have been viewed as authoritative in deciding employment
discrimination cases. 363 As Professor Sullivan notes: “While [the
Uniform Guidelines] have been used mainly for the validation of
traditional paper-and-pencil tests with a disparate impact, the
Guidelines broadly apply to any ‘selection procedure.’” 364
The Uniform Guidelines are useful because they set standards for
when selection criteria could be considered valid. The Uniform
Guidelines provide for “three kinds of validation: criterion, content, and
construct.” 365 The aim of all three types of validation is to prompt the
employer to provide evidence of a predictive causal relationship
between the selection method and the job performance:
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection
procedure by a criterion-related validity study should
consist of empirical data demonstrating that the
selection procedure is predictive of or significantly
correlated with important elements of job
performance. Evidence of the validity of a test or other
selection procedure by a content validity study should
consist of data showing that the content of the
selection procedure is representative of important
aspects of performance on the job for which the
candidates are to be evaluated. Evidence of the
validity of a test or other selection procedure through
a construct validity study should consist of data
showing that the procedure measures the degree to
which candidates have identifiable characteristics
which have been determined to be important in
Commission, and the Department of Justice. Thus, courts have similarly viewed the
Guidelines as authoritative. The court in Gulino noted: “[T]hirty-five years of using these
Guidelines makes them the primary yardstick by which we measure defendants’ attempt to
validate [a standardized certification test].” Gulino v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361,
384 (2d Cir. 2006).
363. Sullivan, supra note 14, at 422 n.106 (noting that per the results of a Lexis Advance
search on Dec. 10, 2017, “[t]he Guidelines have been cited in more than 300 cases, including
a number of Supreme Court decisions”).
364. Id. at 422 nn.107–08 (citations omitted); see also id. at 422 n.108 (discussing 29 C.F.R
§ 1607.3(A) (2018), which explains that “the hiring, promotion, or other employment or
membership opportunities of members of any race, sex, or ethnic group will be considered to
be discriminatory and inconsistent with these guidelines, unless the procedure has been
validated in accordance with these guidelines . . . .”). Sullivan explains that “‘[s]election
procedure’ is in turn defined broadly to include ‘[a]ny measure, combination of measures, or
procedure used as a basis for any employment decision,’ and includes ‘the full range of
assessment techniques from traditional paper and pencil tests, performance tests, training
programs, or probationary periods and physical, educational, and work experience
requirements through informal or casual interviews and unscored application forms.” Id.
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(Q) (2018)).
365. Id. at 423 (citing RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS
OF DISCRIMINATION §§ 5.13–.17 (2d ed. 2017–2018)).
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successful performance in the job for which the
candidates are to be evaluated. 366
As validation generally requires a job analysis, unions can be
actively involved in conducting the job analysis and in thus setting the
standards to demonstrate that: (1) the selection criteria for the hiring
algorithm relate to important aspects of the job, (2) the data used
actually allows for a prediction of future job performance based on the
selection, and (3) the candidate selections are not the result of some
nebulous correlation but rather indicate identifiable characteristics that
are causally related to better job performance. A question arises here as
to whether unions will have the requisite technical savvy to understand
and implement these measures. This dilemma underscores the need for
greater attention to law and technology courses in law school to train
the next generation of union leaders, ensuring they remain competent
to address the next generation of workplace technologies.
But even after the determination of probative data for job fitness,
there still remains the problem of biased data. For example, data that
may be probative for job fitness, such as test scores, may still bear the
taint of past biased decisions. Consider for example that racial housing
segregation has resulted in a concentration of better-resourced schools
in majority-white neighborhoods where students who attend receive
better preparation for standardized tests. Although performance on
standardized tests may be considered probative of job fitness, the use
of such a criterion could result in disparate impact. In recognition of the
historical taint of structural bias on data that could otherwise be
probative, some scholars have called for “algorithmic affirmative
action,” which focuses not merely on the design of algorithms, but also
on transparency about the biases encoded in the data and the correction
of the data used. 367
Alternatively, employers could outright reject the use of such
biased data. For example, rather than depend on standardized testing,
employers might design video games to assess job performance
qualities of applicants, such as “social intelligence, ‘goal-orientation
fluency,’
implicit
learning,
task-switching
ability,
and
conscientiousness.” 368 According to David Savage and Professor
Richard Bales, these algorithms, which only identify individual
personal qualities, can reduce discrimination in evaluating job
366. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5B (2018)) (alterations in original).
367. See Chander, supra note 140, at 1039.
368. See David D. Savage & Richard Bales, Video Games in Job Interviews: Using
Algorithms to Minimize Discrimination and Unconscious Bias, 32 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
211, 222 (2017) (quoting Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watching-you-atwork/354681 [https://perma.cc/9792-WSKK]).
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applicants. 369 Administering video games based on such algorithm in
the initial hiring process not only will decrease disparate treatment and
disparate impact discrimination because they test for individual skill
sets, but they might also reduce unconscious biases in evaluation of job
candidates. 370
2. Data End Uses and Fairness by Design
One common retort to addressing bias in algorithms is that machine
learning algorithms are ungovernable; 371 however, like other legal
scholars, I argue that adjusting the design features of hiring platforms,
coupled with auditing mandates, facilitate antidiscrimination ends by
bringing automated hiring systems under the rule of law. More
specifically, I argue that fairness can be part of the design of these
algorithmic systems from the outset, especially for establishing dataretention features as a standard. These machine learning algorithms,
which have the capacity to derive new models as they learn from large
datasets, are constantly reevaluating the variable inputs of calculations.
Some researchers have argued that humans could lose their agency over
algorithms given the extensive potential of algorithms for calculations
and the amount of data they use. 372 To limit this reduction in choicemaking power, some have exhorted that humans need to set “checks”
on algorithms, ensuring that humans can inspect both the data that
enters the system and the results that exit. 373 By doing so, humans might
reduce the chance that algorithms would grow to be unintelligible over
time. For example, IBM’s Watson algorithm allows periodic
inspections by presenting researchers with the documents it uses to
form the basis for its decisions. 374
By complying with key standards of legal fairness when
determining design features, programmers can reduce discriminatory
effects of hiring algorithms, such that the algorithms avoid disparate
impact for protected classes and comply with the principles of
employment antidiscrimination laws. 375 Professor MacCarthy notes
369. Id. at 224–26.
370. Id.
371. See, e.g., Kroll et al., supra note 21 (noting that some existing algorithmic systems
are largely ungovernable because they were not built with auditing in mind. They note also
that there are ways to build for auditing, but that this design logic should exist at the onset).
372. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Rulemaking and Inscrutable Automated Decision
Tools, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1851, 1852 (2019).
373. See Madalina Busuioc, Accountable Artificial Intelligence: Holding Algorithms to
Account, PUB. ADMIN. REV. (manuscript at 2) (forthcoming).
374. See Ruchir Puri, It’s Time to Start Breaking Open the Black Box of AI, IBM WATSON
BLOG (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson/2018/09/trust-transparency-ai/
[https://perma.cc/P97S-K7VD].
375. See Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for Disparate Impact Assessment of Big
Data Algorithms, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 67, 77–78 (2018).
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that there are disputes about statistical concepts of fairness, especially
between group fairness and individual fairness, because some believe
that antidiscrimination laws aim at practices that disadvantage certain
groups, while others think these laws “target arbitrary misclassification
of individuals.” 376 Those that support group fairness measures, such as
statistical parity 377 and equal group error rates, try to reduce the
subordination of disadvantaged groups by allowing for some sacrifice
of accuracy. 378 As notions of fairness diverge, organizations must
choose which standard to adopt by considering the context of use as
well as normative and legal standards. 379
I argue that to achieve fairness by design for automated hiring
systems, it is also important to incorporate record-keeping and dataretention mechanisms as part of the standard design. Determining
disparate impact in hiring algorithms is a relatively simple matter of
evaluating the outcomes using the EEOC rule. 380 This rule mandates
that “[a] selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less
than four-fifths . . . of the rate for the group with the highest rate will
generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence
of adverse impact.” 381 Currently, however, job applicants who do not
make it past the hiring algorithms are typically lost to the ether. 382 Thus,
there is no sure way for plaintiffs to compare relative percentages of
job applicants who were hired from protected categories against the
number who applied as required by the EEOC rule, 383 and there is still
no clear method to confirm best hiring outcomes against the actual pool
of qualified applicants. As the data from automated hiring systems
remains solely in the control of the employer, appropriate recordkeeping and data-retention procedures are necessary to enable disparate
impact claims.
It thwarts the purpose of the EEOC rule if automated hiring
systems do not retain data when an applicant from a protected category
is prevented from completing an application or do not even retain the
376. Id. at 68. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470
(2004) (providing background for the development of competing theories on equal protection
law); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIA. L. REV. 9 (2003) (relating the history of
the development and application of two distinct antidiscrimination principles in American
law).
377. Proponents of statistical parity argue that it is more desirable because it “equalizes
outcomes across protected and non-protected groups.” See Cynthia Dwork, Moritz Hardt,
Toniann Pitassi, Omer Reingold & Richard Zemel, Fairness Through Awareness, 3
INNOVATIONS IN THEORETICAL COMPUT. SCI. CONF. 214, 215 (2012).
378. See MacCarthy, supra note 375, at 68.
379. See id. at 71.
380. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2020).
381. Id.
382. See O’NEIL, supra note 1, ch. 4.
383. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2020).
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data of complete but unsuccessful applications. My proposal for a legal
requirement for corporations to deploy only automated hiring systems
with data-retention mechanisms would ensure that data from failed job
applicants is preserved so that it can later be compared against that of
the successful applicants, with the aim of discovering whether the data
evinces disparate impact regarding the population of failed applicants.
Although there are valid privacy concerns with the retention of
applicant data, I believe they can be addressed by embargoing the data
at the initial stage, and by a hard deletion of the data after a specified
time. There would also be steep penalties attached to re-selling the data
or co-opting it for end uses besides those expressly assented to by the
applicants.
Responsible record-keeping and data-retention are also necessary
for conducting both internal and external audits. The data for internal
audits serves two purposes: (1) it will alert employers to any disparate
impact created by the automated hiring system, thus allowing them to
preemptively correct any imbalances and avoid costly lawsuits; and
(2) it might also alert employers to more structural issues present in
their hiring. Such structural issues might include: (1) mismatched or
non-probative selection criteria; (2) a shallow hiring pool for applicants
from protected categories; and (3) technical or accessibility problems
present in the automated hiring platform. Thus, the data from internal
audits may offer a direct benefit to employers that is separate from their
duty not to discriminate. 384 Such a boon should be counted in any costbenefit analysis 385 of my proposed record-keeping and data-retention
measures.
3. Data Control and Portability
Earlier in the Article, I noted the vast expanse of information
collected by hiring platforms; for this section I note how the indelibility
of the data profiles created by automated hiring systems could also
enable employment discrimination. Moreover, these data profiles,
384. See, e.g., Bias in the Air, supra note 25, at 1384 (2014) (arguing that employment law
should impose a duty of care on employers to refrain from practices that go against equal
opportunity in employment); see also Robert Post, Lecture, Prejudicial Appearances: The
Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 40 (2000) (arguing that
antidiscrimination law aims to achieve positive intervention and change in social practices as
opposed to solely dictating prohibitions). Other professors have also used a “duty of care”
framework to propose remedial measures for employment discrimination. See Negligent
Discrimination, supra note 28, at 933; see also Managing the Macaw, supra note 29, at 1364.
I later discuss why the duty not to engage in practices that negate equal opportunity supports
my external audit proposal.
385. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Lecture, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution
Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 161 (1984) (arguing that there is a
“pernicious tendency” for cost-benefit analysis to “dwarf soft variables” in constitutional
law).
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some of which are created by third-party automated hiring vendors,
contain not just information provided by the job applicant, but also data
gleaned from online sources (such as social media profiles) and peddled
by gray market data brokers. 386 Therefore, such information may
include errors or could provide an inaccurate portrait of the applicant
as construed from the erroneous data. 387 Even if the information
contained in the profile is accurate, there is also the issue of “context
collapse,” 388 wherein information the applicant provided in the context
of applying for one specific job position may inappropriately be revived
to evaluate the candidate for another job position.
Given these problems, applicant control and agency over both data
collection and the portability of any created applicant profiles are
crucial matters. Thus, as part of collective bargaining, unions should
negotiate with employers regarding how applicant data will be handled.
There is some tension here between data retention for the purpose of
facilitating audits and applicants’ control of their data. But that tension
is easily resolved by data anonymization and aggregation. The relevant
data for audits here is demographic data that reveal protected
characteristics. Unions can negotiate with firms not to retain or trade in
applicant profiles that contain not just demographic data but sensitive
personal information and evaluations about applicant fitness.
4. Preventing “Algorithmic Blackballing”
Negotiations regarding the retention of subjective applicant
profiles or evaluations are necessary to avoid what I term “algorithmic
386. See, e.g., Web Scraping as a Valuable Instrument for Proactive Hiring, DATAHEN
(Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.datahen.com/web-scraping-valuable-instrument-proactivehiring/ [https://perma.cc/2DQY-QQAY] (“What can recruiters do to use this huge advantage
to their benefit? They can scrape or crawl data off of those kind [sic] of job portals and run
analytics through it. By doing so they are able to determine the likelihood of filling a particular
position in a specified location based on historical data patterns.”). The article further notes
that “[e]verything is relevant and important here and can impact the results of the research.
Every little nuance, like the day of the week, [sic] certain types of jobs should be posted or
other kinds of factors that will influence the decision making of the prospective candidate.”
Id.
387. Consider Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Association, where the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that defendant SARMA had created an erroneous
profile for Thompson by automatically “capturing” the incorrect social security number for
his profile and erroneously reporting the bad credit history of another man by the same
common name. 682 F.2d 509, 509 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Spokeo v. Robins, Inc., 136 S. Ct.
1540, 1550 (2016) (holding that a “people search engine” provided incorrect personal
information about a consumer to employers, and further that the consumer may not be able to
show concrete injury).
388. Scholars have used the term “context collapse” to describe the phenomenon when
communication that is meant for one particular audience is transported to another (dissimilar)
audience without context or translation, resulting in misunderstanding or acrimony. See, e.g.,
Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, I Tweet Honestly, I Tweet Passionately: Twitter Users,
Context Collapse, and the Imagined Audience, 13 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 114, 122 (2010).
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blackballing.” When applicant profiles are allowed to live on past their
shelf life, such profiles may come to haunt the applicant in a different
bid for work, whether with the same employer or, if traded, with
another employer. 389 Absent any quick federal action to regulate this,
unions could have a role to play.
Consider this scenario: John applies for work through the hiring
platform of a major corporation. This platform creates profiles of all
applicants. From those profiles, the employer chooses a subset of
applicants to invite for interviews and rejects the rest. However, the
hiring platform retains the profiles of all job applicants and uses that
data internally; whenever the applicant applies again for a job, even if
it is a different job from the initial attempt, this applicant profile is
revived and data from it once again becomes the basis for a rejection.
This result is unfair for various reasons. First, the continued retention
and use of applicant profiles misappropriates applicant data — when
applicants submit an application, they intend for the information they
provide to be used solely for establishing their fitness for the target job
position. It is not commonly understood that applicant data submitted
at one moment in time could once again, potentially many years later,
be used as evidence of whether an applicant is fit for another job.
Second, retention and re-use of an applicant profile deny the applicant
a chance to present himself in a manner that is more competitive for the
job. For example, the applicant could have achieved tangible assets like
a new credential or have attained less quantifiable attributes such as
better communication skills.
Further exacerbating the problem is that there are no laws
prohibiting automated hiring platforms from selling applicant data.
This means that applicant data created for one specific employer could
be transported for the use of a completely different employer.
Consequently, an applicant rejected by one employer could also,
without leave to submit amendments to their profile, continue to be
rejected by multiple employers.
I term this type of exclusion “algorithmic blackballing.” The
algorithmic blackballing of applicants thwarts the goals of
antidiscrimination law. While an applicant may not be right for a
specific job at a specific point in time, using the same information that
underlies that determination and applying it to a different job, even if
at the same company, is antithetical to the bedrock legal doctrine of
equal opportunity for all job applicants.

389. Professors Rick Bales and Katherine Stone have argued: “The electronic resume
produced by AI will accompany workers from job to job as they move around the
boundaryless workplace.” Bales & Stone, supra note 60, at 3.

No. 2]

Auditing Imperative

683

D. The Employer’s Burden
Any opposition to my proposals will largely entail economic
critiques centered on the cost to employers; however, those arguments
ignore that the overarching aim of employment antidiscrimination law
is to preserve equal opportunity for all job applicants and that
antidiscrimination imposes a duty on employers to work towards that
end. 390 It is true that audits cost both time and money, so employers
could argue that mandated audits pose an undue economic burden and
would negate the cost-saving benefits of automated hiring. However,
as legal scholars like Professor Charles Sullivan have recognized:
“antidiscrimination laws do not require shareholder value
maximization . . . . The statutes do accommodate productivity concerns
by allowing neutral practices with a disparate impact to be justified by
business necessity.” 391
Professor Richard Thompson Ford’s position 392 even more
forcefully supports the argument for employers to shoulder the burden
of checking for bias in algorithmic hiring systems. Ford argues that
employment discrimination law:
imposes a duty of care on employers to avoid
decisions that undermine social equality . . . . [W]e
could better improve employment discrimination
law—making it more successful as an egalitarian
intervention and less intrusive on legitimate employer
prerogatives—if we abandoned attempts to precisely
define concepts such as “objective causation” and
“discriminatory intent” and instead focused on
refining the employer’s duty of care to avoid
antiegalitarian employment decisions. 393
If, as Ford argues, employment discrimination law already imposes
a duty of care on employers to ensure that their employment decisions
are not discriminatory, then calling for mandated audits of algorithmic
hiring systems does not impose a new burden; rather, it merely
delineates exactly how that duty of care should be fulfilled. Mandated
audits are in line with the duty of care to verify that employment
390. Cf. SOLON BAROCAS & HELEN NISSENBAUM, Big Data’s End Run Around Anonymity
and Consent, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR
ENGAGEMENT 44, 44 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014) (noting that “where these data commit to
record details about human behavior, they have been perceived as a threat to fundamental
values, including everything from autonomy, to fairness, justice, due process, property,
solidarity, and, perhaps most of all, privacy”).
391. Sullivan, supra note 14, at 398 n.12.
392. See Bias in the Air, supra note 25.
393. Id. (emphasis added).

684

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 34

decisions are not unlawfully discriminatory. Moreover, self-audits need
not be prohibitively costly. If, as I detail in Section V.C.2, the
automated hiring system has already been designed in such a way to
retain and easily produce the information needed for the audits, the
process of conducting self-audits should in reality pose no added
economic burden. I will also note here that given that there is already a
legal obligation for employers to engage in collective bargaining, the
proposals discussed here could be part of that process and thus should
not incur additional expense.

VI. CONCLUSION
In a previous article, I detailed how automated hiring has been
perceived as a panacea for human bias in employment decisionmaking. 394 However, as I argued in this article, automated hiring may
in actuality represent a misguided Gordian knot approach to the
systemic problem of employment discrimination. As automated
decision-making cannot be fully disentangled from human decisionmaking, the former action cannot then be an antidote for the noxious
effects of the latter. The human hand, and its attendant bias, remains
present in automated decision-making. One concern then is that
automated hiring represents a Trojan horse; 395 although it appears as a
time- and money-saving gift to corporations inundated by a deluge of
job applications, in reality, it may conceal amplified bias and replicate
unlawful discrimination, all disguised as artificial intelligence. The
problems with automated hiring as identified elude the parameters of
litigation redress mechanisms. This is true especially when considering
the onerous proof requirements of antidiscrimination law. Thus, to
enjoy any benefits of automated hiring systems, without further
exacerbating the existing problem of bias, I advocate for a hybrid
approach that deploys mechanisms from labor law and administrative
law. This necessitates the recognition of an auditing imperative as part
of an employer’s affirmative duty of care. To fulfill such an auditing
imperative demands record-keeping and data-retention mandates,
including ex ante non-adversarial interventions such as collective
bargaining, to set the standards for data collection. Working in tandem,
these proposed measures will get us closer as a society to the American
ideal of equal opportunity in employment.

394. See Ajunwa, supra note 6.
395. My thanks to Professor Ryan Calo for noting this particular analogy during my paper
workshop at the Privacy Law Scholars Conference.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: An Evaluation of Extant Hiring Algorithms 396

Automated
Hiring
Platform or
Software
Program

Year
Created

Companies Using
Them

Features

ADP
Workforce
Now

2009

• More than 20,000
clients by 2011

• Presents candidate data
in proprietary
dashboard
• “Benchmarking”
insights used to
determine
compensation etc.;
bills data as “decisionquality”

ApplicantPro

2007

• Goodwill
• JC Resorts
• New York State
Psychiatric
Institute

• Automated screening
• Integrated behavioral
assessments
• Integrated background
checks
• Automated tracking of
compliance data

Arya
(LeoForce)

2013

Unknown

• Purports to be
“unbiased” on
company website
• Mimics searches of
company’s most
successful recruiters
• Automated sourcing
• Predicts whether
candidates are likely to
move jobs
• Data includes things
like “growth in the
companies they have
worked for”

Ascentis

2007

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Bel Brands USA
BevMo!
Calibre
Cancún Resort
Las Vegas
Ghirardelli
Level 3
Communications
LaForce
Proficio Bank

• Advertises itself as
defense to
discrimination lawsuits
and seeks to automate
EEO/OFCCP
compliance
• Social media
integration

396. My thanks to my research assistants, Eric Liberatore, Jane Kim, and Kayleigh Yerdon
who all contributed to this table. For brevity, this table only displays up to ten company names.
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• Can track demographic
trends in applicant
sourcing

AssessFirst

2003

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Air France
Burger King
Olympus
Ingenico Group
AXA
BNP Paribas
SMCP

• Predicts recruiting
success with
psychometrics
• Can pre-select
candidates
• Algorithm compares
job profile to candidate
profiles to source
applicants

BALANCEtrak
(Berkshire
Associates)

2010

•
•
•
•

Sodexo
FCS Financial
84 Lumber
And five others

• Screening and scoring
features
• Tracks jobseeker
activity
• Background check
integration

BirdDogHR

2010

• Utz
• CF Evans
Construction
• Iowa DOT
• Martin Marietta
Materials
• Optima Tax
Relief
• Surgical
Specialties
Corporation

• Automated screening
and scoring
• Integrated drug testing
and background check
results

Breezy HR

2014

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Shipt
Linium
Microsoft
Personnel
Docebo
Appcues
Telus
Piksel
Zapier
Freshii
And five others

• Pre-recorded applicant
video interviews
• Standardized guides for
interviewing and
scoring quantify (and
therefore “justify”)
subjective evaluations
• Sources candidates
based on where
recruiters previously
sourced
• Generates
EEO/OFCCP
compliance report,
which could be
problematic

Bullhorn

1999

• Vet2Tech
• The Chatham
Group
• Perma-Seal
• BVS Trans Tech
• Ecotech

• Predictive intelligence
suggests who to
contact, when to
contact them, and how
to take action
• Captures info from the
Web to source
candidates
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Consulting
Group
• Apex Systems
• ALKU
• And two others
ClearCompany
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2004

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

CleverStaff

2014

•
•
•
•
•
•

Comeet

2012

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

• Encourages “run[ning]
your business by the
numbers”

Borden
MetaBank
Goodwill
Jackson Hospital
Arizona Supreme
Court
Sandhills
Community
College
PSCU Financial
Services
Philips
Edible
Arrangements
Applied
Technical
Systems

• Predictive performance
data and quality of hire
reports
• Pre-recorded video
interviewing
• Enables text messaging
with candidates, then
attaches those
conversations to profile
• Automates background
and reference checks;
can make
authorizations less
explicit
• Passive candidate
sourcing
• Gives current
employees referral
tools
• Lets users organize
applicants by any
metric
• Comes with automatic
“interview guides” to
suggest what should be
asked
• One-click background
check

Kama Games
Conscencia
Verta Media
Svitla Systems
Avon
RSM

• Suggests “appropriate”
candidates
• Resume parsing

Gartner
Gett
Fiverr
SodaStream
SironSource
AppsFlyer
Zoom
Chegg
Matomy Media
Group
• Playbuzz

• Assessment analytics
• App guides
interviewers
• Sourcing includes
social media profiles
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• And two others
COMPAS
for Staffing

2008

•
•
•
•

Crelate
Talent

2012

Unknown

Entelo

2010

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Exelare

1999

• Arrow
International
• Global Rhymes
• ERIMAX
• Teachers R Us
• BlueSky
Technology
Partners
• Operation
Homefront

• Resume harvesting

Firefish

2010

• Nine Twenty
• Lancaster &
Duke
• Purcon
• Revoco
• Avantus
• T-Impact
• Baobab Sales

• Color-codes candidates
to rank them
• Records all
communication with
candidates, from text to
VOIP, for everyone in
company to use

TEEMA
Cypress
Talener
David Aplin
Group

Hubspot
Splunk
Intel
Wayfair
Lyft
PG&E
Cisco
United Airlines
Netflix
EA
And ten others

• Assessments
• Recruiting intelligence
analytics
• Social integration
• Automated sourcing
• Detailed candidate
profiles
• Candidate analytics in
reports
• Generates
EEO/OFCCP
compliance report,
which could be
problematic
• Prescreening questions
• Predicts best
candidates using
hundreds of variables
• Candidate social media
automatically available
• Predicts whether
currently employed
candidates are likely to
move
• While it allows users to
sort candidates from
underrepresented
groups to the top, that
also implies a user
could sort those
candidates out
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Glider

2015

• Tavant
Technologies
• DataRPM
• Inmobi
• TATA
Consultancy
Services
• TATA Power
• KPMG
• Facebook
• Nutanix
• Novopay
• Fortinet
• And seven others

• AI “stack ranks”
candidates and sends
personalized messages
• Auto-scores screening,
allowing people with
no technical knowledge
to evaluate
performance on
technical tasks
• One-way video
interviewing
• Tracks if candidates
opened emails

Greenhouse

2012

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Airbnb
Evernote
Pinterest
Red Ventures
Twilio
Vimeo
Survey Monkey
DocuSign
Golden State
Warriors
• Lyft
• J.D. Power

• Attempts to standardize
interviews with
“interview kits”
• Tracks to generate
insights on candidates
• “Data-driven hiring”
• Compares company
hiring metrics to
industry standards,
reinforcing status quo

HireCentric
(ExactHire)

2007

• Kreig Devault
• Endeavor
Robotics
• Navy Army
Community
Credit Union
• Wabash Valley
Power
• Bluestone
Properties
• Central
Restaurant
Products

• Social media
integration
• Screening and scoring
• Integrated background
checks
• Touts compliance

HireVue

2004

• Singapore
Airlines
• TJX
• Honeywell
• Intel
• Mount Sinai
• IBM
• Vodafone
• Urban Outfitters
• Under Armour
• Hilton
• And 46 others

• Predictive people
analytics
• Uses “video
intelligence” to make
automated assessments
based off video
interviews (verbal
response, intonation,
nonverbal
communication, and
other data) and predict
skills, fit, and
performance
• Micro-facial analysis
for traits such as
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veracity and
trustworthiness
• Acquired MindX
(psychometric games)
to further develop
assessment capabilities
• Structured interviews
Hyrell

2007

• City of Pittsfield
(MA)
• NFSTC
• D.L. Evans Bank
• FASTSIGNS
• Primrose Schools
• National
Cattlemen’s Beef
Association

• Pre-scores applicants
• Provides analytics on
applicants

iCIMS

1999

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Foot Locker
Dentsu Aegis
Dish Network
Ketchum
AmTrust
Trilogy
Gannett Fleming
NorthStar
Mohawk
Southeastern
Grocers
• And 12 others

• Automated
communication with
candidates
• Recruits through social
media; applying via
Facebook means they
can access candidate’s
Facebook
• Facilitates employee
referrals, reinforcing
historical hiring
patterns
• Screening and
assessment results

JazzHR

2016

•
•
•
•
•
•

Mashable
Speck
Red Bull
GoGo Squeez
Wedding Wire
R/GA

• Like many, automates
some communication
• Guided interviews
• Evaluation templates
with automated scoring

JobDiva

2003

• Telesis
Corporation
• Tech Firefly
• Trantor Software
• FEV Inc.
• Essnova
Solutions

• Pre-screening and
sorting based on
answers
• Can refine by
geography, education,
and “other”
• Automates resume
sorting

Jobjet

2016

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Cisco
Amazon
Korn Ferry
Synechron
Zoom
Parsons
AMN Healthcare

• Finds personal emails
and mobile phone
numbers for
candidates, even if they
didn’t apply with them
• Also finds professional
history, even if not
disclosed
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• Kaiser
Permanente

JobScore

2006

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Jobsoid

2013

• Shift Technology
• Destinations of
the World
• The Fern Hotels
& Resorts
• VIB
• PBS Worldwide
BVBA
• Voglis Co. Ltd.
• English Lakes
Hotels, Resorts
and Venues
• BiOZEEN
• Waman Hari
Pethe Jewelers
• Axtrum Solutions
• Keley Consulting

Jobvite

2006

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Dialpad
Bleacher Report
Parc
Gracenote
Edmunds
Hearst
Sesame
Workshop

Weight Watchers
JCPenney
LinkedIn
Blizzard
Entertainment
Education First
Havas Group
Universal Music
Group
Partners in
Health

• Uses “Big Data” to
source and qualify
candidates
• Brands on speed —
“20x faster”
• Return on Investment
(ROI) analytics on
applicant sources
• Employee referral
integration
• Social media
integration
• Automated compliance
• Standardized
interviewing/templates
• Turns resumes into
weighted scores
• Sorts interviewed
candidates by “thumbs
up/down” rankings
• Claims to reduce hiring
risk with data that
originates with a
ranked list of what the
company finds
important
• Social integration
• Sourcing with
“advanced
intelligence”
• Interview scoring
• Video screening

• Referral emphasis
• Filters out candidates
• Emphasizes time and
costs saved
• One-way video for
recorded assessments
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• Seneca
• Trek
• Wayfair
Lever

2012

• Automated sourcing
• Assessments built-in
• Predictions and
recommendations
• Encourages fast
decisions as “datadriven”
• Features to automate
nurturing top talent

•
•
•

Quora
Reddit
Lyft
Hot Topic
KPMG
Wieden +
Kennedy
Netflix
Success
Academy Charter
Schools
Eventbrite
Soylent
And five others
Nestlé
Amazon
Dropbox
Siemens

• Predicts candidate
interest in
company/industry, how
candidates will work
with current
employees, and who
would relocate
• Tracks LinkedIn user
searches, connections,
follows, publications,
and likes to generate
data for recruiters
• Uses factors like
candidate city or
school in reports on
how to find talent

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

LinkedIn
Talent
Insights

2017

•
•
•
•

Loxo

2012

• Valor Partners
• Ingenium
• Contract
Recruiter
• Robinson
Resource Group
• The Carolan
Group
• Indigo Partners
• Dental Team
Finder

• Finds personal contact
info on candidates
• Automates sourcing

Mya

2017

• Adecco Group

• Automates sourcing,
screening, and
scheduling
• Sends data from
“conversations”
directly to ATS
• Machine learning
means her interactions
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are based on past
candidates
• Can only interact with
candidates who apply
online; thus, candidates
who apply in-person
cannot be hired
Newton

2009

Unknown

Oleeo

2018 397

•
•
•
•
•
•

Bank of America
Morgan Stanley
NBC Universal
WPP
Marks & Spencer
UK Civil Service

• Claims to eliminate
bias by automating
every step
• Prescriptive hiring
recommendations
• Clients can apply via
social profiles
• Sorting in/out based on
skills
• Auto-scoring of
applicants

Olivia
(Paradox)

2017

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

CVS Health
Staples
Sprint
Delta Air Lines
DXC Technology
Alorica
Pilot Flying J

• Assistive intelligence
recruiting assistant that
“talks” to interested
candidates and creates
data on them
• Machine learning
means her interactions
are based on past
candidates

Oracle Taleo

2012 398

• Western Union
• Hitachi
Consulting
• Hill International
• NMDP
• Chubb
• Chicago Public
Schools
• JPMorgan Chase
• Wegmans
• Honda

• Social media and
referral sourcing

PeopleFluent

1997

• Altair
• American Cancer
Society
• Aon
• Avaya
• Blue Cross Blue
Shield
• Citrix

• Integrates recruiting
software with other
talent management
platforms (learning,
compensation,
collaboration, etc.)
• Vendor Management
Software gives control

• Built-in EEO/OFCCP
compliance could raise
concerns

397. Oleeo was originally formed in 1995 as WCN.
398. Taleo existed prior to this, but in 2012 was acquired by Oracle.
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Family Dollar
Hertz
McDonald’s
Nationwide

over
contingent/contract
labor

Toyota
Avis/Budget
Briscoe Group
Bupa
Calder Stewart
Skyline
New Zealand
Avocado
• Marra Building
Solutions
• Elms Hotel

• Automatically ranks
candidates
• Will soon automate
searching for top talent

•
•
•
•
QJumpers

2006

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Recruitee

2015

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Greenpeace
Vice
Taco Bell
Hotjar
Hudson’s Bay
Sky
Zomato
QWILR
Scotch & Soda
Lacoste
And two others

• Imports passive
candidates from social
media sites
• Can set default reasons
for disqualification

Recruiterbox

2009

•
•
•
•
•

Wolfram
The Onion
Makita
Swift Capital
Olark

• Prospecting of
candidates
• Assessment templates

Recruiterflow

2017

• FusionCharts
• Ixigo
• Canvas Search
Group
• Khosla Labs
• ParallelDots
• E2X

• Structured interviewing
and scoring
• Automated sourcing

SkillSurvey

2001

• Clemson
University
• DocuSign
• Penn Medicine
• Talbots
• L.L. Bean
• Burlington Coat
Factory
• Brown-Forman
• Adidas
• Keurig
• MedOptions
• And four others

• Online referencechecking
• Claims predictive
technology reduces
bias
• Physician peerreferencing online
(unique service)
• Automates tracking of
pipeline candidates
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SmartRecruiters

2010

• Optimizely
• Colliers
International
• Berkshire
Healthcare
• Associa
• Atlassian
• Foster Farms
• FishNet Security
• Smaato
• Equinox

• Metrics aim to focus
recruiting to
historically effective
sources
• Assessment tools
• Measures performance
and fit
• Aims to make
interviewing
“objective” with
scorecards (yet this
merely quantifies
subjective assessments)

Talenthire
(CEIPAL)

2013

Unknown

• Social media
integration
• Vendor management
integration for
contingent labor
• Target sourcing

Teamtailor

2012

•
•
•
•
•
•

Tenant & Partner
Arken Zoo
Notified
SATS
Vårdkraft
Ingenjörer utan
gränser
• Paradox
Interactive
• Servicefinder

• Screening questions for
applicants, sortable by
candidate answers
• ROI-driven analytics
discourage innovative
recruiting

TextRecruit

2014

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

VidCruiter

2009

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

UPS
Six Flags
Ford
Whole Foods
USAA
The Cheesecake
Factory
Amazon
Kindred
Healthcare
Supercuts
VMware
Con-way Freight

• AI texting/online
messaging chatbot
performs “sentiment
analysis” to determine
candidate satisfaction
during conversations
(also does this for
current employees)
• Integrates with ATS

Liberty Mutual
Axiom Law
KIPP
University of
Hawaii at Mānoa
IT Convergence
Miratel Solutions
Olameter
Wondersitter

• Automates
interviewing with oneway video using
predetermined
questions
• Automatically ranks
candidates based on
pre-recorded
interviews
• Website advertises that
it “protect[s]” from
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• UBC Sauder
School of
Business
• iPacesetters
• And four others

discrimination lawsuits
by using structured
interviews
• Partnered with Checkr
(background check
app) to give immediate
background check
reports right in the
recruitment platform
• Specifically promotes
ability to see what
candidates look like
before interviewing
• Gamification of skills
testing
• Attempts to use
behavioral science to
determine cultural fit
• Ranks on personality,
in addition to
assessments of skills,
experience, and
education

Whozwho

2017

• Kids Village
• Nightowl
• Sales Coaching
International
• Simple

Workable

2012

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Cognizant
Porsche
Ryanair
Sears
Sephora
Wyndham Hotel
Group
Upwork
Basecamp
Zapier
Merrill
Corporation
And three others

• Sourcing tool
aggregates social
profile data to create
candidate profiles
• Facilitates employee
referrals
• Structured interviews
and scorecards

Workday

2005

Unknown 399

• Import social media
profiles
• Encourages shifting of
talent spending to what
software determines is
working
• Top-talent focus

Workpop

2014

•
•
•
•
•

Fresh Brothers
The Melting Pot
Giant Eagle
Sprinkles
Ashley
Homestore
• WCG Hotels

• Automated sourcing
• Algorithm based on
millions of applications
sets starting bids for
each position on job
boards

399. We are unable to determine which companies specifically use the recruiting module of
Workday, just companies that use any Workday module.
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• Grows applicant pool
by having applicants
add co-workers as
references; the
references themselves
are then in the pool
• Automates rankings of
candidates with Smart
Rank
Zoho Recruit

1996

• DreamWorks
• Manning Global
• Columbia
University
School of
Professional
Studies
• Tata Projects
• Urban Eats
• RBL Bank
• Sterlite Power
• GEP
• Scientific Games
• International
School of
London Qatar

• Social media candidate
sourcing
• Allows reformatting of
parsed resumes; can
delete candidate
resume information
before sharing with rest
of company

Table 2: Strategies for Beating Automated Hiring Platforms
Method

Description

“Key Word”
Usage

Look at employer’s job description and try to include in
your resume as many of the exact buzz words it uses. Avoid
synonyms — use exact language. 400

Avoid OverComplication

These systems can get confused by over-complication
(including fancy fonts, colors, and graphics), so they will
not select a resume if it contains these elements. 401

Follow-Up

People are sorted out of AHPs so often that recruiters may
not know which candidates are genuinely interested and
which simply “dropped” their resumes there. If you are
genuinely interested, one of the best ways to beat the AHP is
to follow up with a recruiter via LinkedIn or other sites. 402

Relevant
Keywords

Keywords are rated higher by algorithms when they appear
in a relevant paragraph (with related text), so if you can add

400. See Trudy Steinfeld, Decoding the Job Search: How to Beat the ATS (Applicant
Tracking
System),
FORBES
(May
31,
2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/trudysteinfeld/2016/05/31/decoding-the-job-search-how-tobeat-the-ats-applicant-tracking-system [https://perma.cc/98L9-LQPW].
401. See id.
402. See id.
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this to your resume in a section about your
accomplishments, you should. 403
Use Free
Screening Tools

Applicants can check to see how well their resume will scan
by using free sites like jobscan.com. 404

Full Titles and
Acronyms

Some AHPs will look for the acronym of a title/certification
(CPA, for example), while others will look for the spelledout form of the title (Certified Public Accountant). Be sure
to include both on your resume. 405

Avoid Spelling
Mistakes

Many AHPs will terminate your application immediately if
you have spelling mistakes, because they will not
understand what you’re trying to say. 406

Avoid Headers
and Footers

Headers and footers will “jam” algorithms, meaning that the
algorithm will not be able to process your resume further.
Avoid these! 407

Submit Resume in
Text Format

While many people opt to send their resumes in PDF
format, this leaves the parser open to making more errors.
Typically, the easiest format for the scanner to read is in
Text Format. 408

Include Postal
Address

Most scanners will automatically screen out your resume if
it does not include a postal address. Just remember — don’t
include this information in a header or footer, as it will not
be screened! 409

Pay Attention to
Font

Avoid serif fonts (such as Times New Roman), because
some screeners reject resumes with these fonts. 410

Stick to
“Orthodox”
Sections

Name your sections “Work Experience” and “Education”
instead of “Career Achievements” or “Training,” because
AHPs are trained to search for specific information under

403. See How to Beat Automated Resume Screening, WORKOPOLIS (June 28, 2017),
https://careers.workopolis.com/advice/beat-automated-resume-screening
[https://perma.cc/H28G-VH5R].
404. See id.
405. See Regina Borsellino, Beat the Robots: How to Get Your Resume Past the System &
Into Human Hands, MUSE, https://www.themuse.com/advice/beat-the-robots-how-to-getyour-resume-past-the-system-into-human-hands [https://perma.cc/NG3L-J7FC].
406. See id.
407. See Peter Cappelli, How to Get a Job? Beat the Machines, TIME (June 11, 2012),
http://business.time.com/2012/06/11/how-to-get-a-job-beat-the-machines
[https://perma.cc/U8VK-XHFT].
408. See id.
409. See Pamela Skillings, How to Get the Applicant Tracking System to Pick Your
Resume, BIG INTERVIEW (Mar. 2015), https://biginterview.com/blog/2015/03/applicanttracking-system.html [https://perma.cc/YB9D-MWDW].
410. See Melanie Pinola, Format Your Resume So It Gets Past Applicant Screening
Software, LIFEHACKER (Feb. 26, 2013, 2:00 PM), https://lifehacker.com/5987055/formatyour-resume-so-its-compatible-with-applicant-screening-software [https://perma.cc/4VBAYQCJ].
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specific sections (usually, Education, Work Experience,
Skills and Contact Information). 411
Apply Early

Some AHPs charge employers by the applicant, so it’s
cheaper for companies to review the first 50 applicants than
to review every applicant who applies. Thus, late applicants
are sometimes discarded without even being screened. 412

Be Average on
Personality Tests

“Score somewhere between the 40th and 60th percentiles”
and “try to answer as if you were like everybody else is
supposed to be.” Basically, try to answer questions in the
most average way possible. 413

When Asked for
Word
Associations . . .

“When asked for word associations or comments about the
world, give the most conventional, run-of-the-mill,
pedestrian answer possible.” 414

Incline to
Conservatism

When asked about your values on personality tests, read
closely through all questions to look for patterns. In some
tests, the “right” or “most conservative” answers will be
located in the same multiple-choice position for each
question. 415

When it Comes to
Hypothetical
Judgment
Questions, Don’t
Reflect

Many personality tests include hypothetical situations that
are followed by questions about how the respondent would
act if faced with that scenario. Research has shown that it is
best not to reflect on the question before answering, and that
respondents should answer as quickly as they can to avoid
giving off the sense that they are confused about what steps
they would take. 416

Add Buzz Words
in White Ink

To “trick” the algorithm into sorting you through, some
applicants have suggested including more buzz words
throughout their resumes, but in white ink so that they are
not visible to the human eye. Thus, their application will be
automatically screened into the “yes” pile without having to
awkwardly force buzz words into their documents. 417

411. See Richard Poulin, Is Your Resume Ready for Automated Screening?, LINKEDIN
(Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/your-resume-ready-automated-screeningrichard-poulin/ [https://perma.cc/NWV9-FD2Y].
412. See id.
413. See WILLIAM H. WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN 405 (2002).
414. See id.
415. See id. at 408.
416. See id. at 409.
417. See Osas Obaiza, Hack Your Resume to Fool Keyword-Hunting Robots & Land
Yourself More Interviews (The Evil Way), WONDER HOW TO (May 16, 2013, 2:16 PM),
https://jobs-resumes.wonderhowto.com/how-to/hack-your-resume-fool-keyword-huntingrobots-land-yourself-more-interviews-the-evil-way-0146824/
[https://perma.cc/G994AA6C].

